Abstract
1. Consider first a loose presentation of the BIA for the FIPD. Players 1 and 2 will play a finite number of runs of a game that has the structure of a prisoner's dilemma. We assume that it is rational not to cooperate in a single-run prisoner's dilemma. But if it is rational not to cooperate in the single-run game, then it is also rational not to cooperate in the last run of the finite iterated game. Whatever your opponent chooses, the non-cooperative choice yields a higher payoff and - just like in the single-run game - there is nothing to be gained over and above the payoff in the last run. Furthermore, if there is no cooperative play to be expected in the last run, then it is also rational not to cooperate in the next to last run, since there is nothing to be gained over and above the payoff in this next to last run.
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