The analysis of evolutionary strategies to facilitate the transformation of traditional buildings into prefabricated buildings

Abstract

This paper establishes a two-party evolutionary game theory model comprising of the governments and prefabricated components suppliers as the players; and uses the replicator dynamic equations to analyze the evolution mechanisms each player’s strategy choices. Results from numerical simulations indicate that the evolution trajectory of the model is significantly influenced by not only the initial strategies of the players, but also by government incentives and regulatory penalties, as well as the costs and benefits resulted from each strategy choice. Also, prefabricated components suppliers exhibit greater responsiveness to variations in cost-related factors. When the subsidy and penalty respectively remain constant at 15% and 5% of the additional cost, the model exhibits both rapid and stable evolutionary trend towards the optimal evolutionarily stable strategy of full cooperation between the two players. This article proposes a suitable threshold for government incentives and penalties, besides serving as a guide for the steady and sustainable growth of the prefabricated buildings sector.