Abstract

With the rapid development of information technology, the sharing economy based on “Internet plus” cloud platforms has become a new collaborative innovation mode and a hot topic in recent years. Considering that government regulation restricts green innovation cooperation among cloud manufacturing enterprises, an evolutionary game model involving the government and cloud manufacturing enterprises A and B with potential differences in their technology knowledge is established using evolutionary game theory. A replication dynamic equation is established, the evolutionarily stable equilibrium strategy of the three parties is analysed, and the key factors affecting the cooperative selection strategy of the government and cloud manufacturing enterprises are discussed through a MATLAB-based numerical simulation. This research shows that when governmental incentives and punishments, the platform load capacity, the trust between enterprises, the technology loss coefficient, and the informatization degree are increased, the government will tend to choose supervision, and cloud manufacturing enterprises A and B will tend to choose the “collaborative innovation” strategy. These results provide a scientific basis suggesting that the government should not only formulate rules and regulations for cloud manufacturing enterprises but also promote green collaborative innovation among such enterprises and enhance their core competitiveness.

Highlights

  • With the rapid development of information technology, Internet-based strategies are accelerating worldwide

  • Few have linked producers’ green innovation to cloud manufacturing. Due to this gap in the literature, we focus on cloud manufacturing enterprises’ green innovation cooperation process to explore its evolutionary game relationships under the supervision of government and cloud platforms

  • As enterprise A’s participation increases, green innovation technology and innovation resources accumulate, and the number of enterprises A participating further increases. erefore, the government should give subsidies to enterprise A, enhance the enthusiasm of enterprise A to engage in collaborative innovation, allow enterprise A to take the lead, cooperate extensively with enterprise B, and make full use of the existing resources. e government should play a guiding role and jointly create a good cloud platform innovation environment for green collaborative innovation

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Summary

Introduction

With the rapid development of information technology, Internet-based strategies are accelerating worldwide. (1) is paper aims to analyse the evolutionary trend of the dynamic cooperation process of enterprise green innovation in the cloud manufacturing environment and measure the influence of various factors on the equilibrium strategy in different situations. Is paper reviews and summarizes the relevant literature, which can be divided into the following three categories: (1) the concept and application of cloud manufacturing enterprises; (2) the government’s role in green collaborative innovation; and (3) evolutionary game theory. Based on this literature review, there are abundant research studies that use evolutionary game theory to investigate participants’ dynamic behaviours under government policy. A tripartite evolutionary game model is developed to describe the dynamic behaviour and interaction mechanism among government, cloud manufacturing enterprise A, and cloud manufacturing enterprise B (there is technological distance between enterprises) and explore green innovation cooperation from a new perspective. As important members of the green innovation process, the government and cloud platforms play important regulatory roles. is paper provides a scientific basis for the decision making of the government and cloud manufacturing enterprises, which helps promote the green collaborative innovation of cloud manufacturing enterprises and enhance the core competitiveness of enterprises

Problem Description and Basic Assumptions
Basic Assumptions
Model Construction and Analysis
Replication Dynamic Equation of the Game Model
Numerical Experiment and Simulation
Conclusion
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