Abstract
This paper investigates whether an emissions tax (equivalent to an emissions cap) maximizes social welfare (defined as the sum of consumer and producer surplus) in the presence of incomplete regulation (leakage) or market power by analyzing an intensity standard regulating emissions per unit of output. This paper analyzes the effect of passive investment in rival firms on the setting of uniform taxes and uniform absolute emission standards by the government. This article is concerned with taxation in general, its principles, its objectives, and its effects; specifically, the article discusses the nature and purposes of taxation, whether taxes should be classified as direct or indirect, the history of taxation, canons and criteria of taxation, and economic effects of taxation, including shifting and incidence (identifying who bears the ultimate burden of taxes when that burden is passed from the person or entity deemed legally responsible for it to another).
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