Abstract

Ecological compensation for inter-basin water transfer is an effective way of coordinating regional ecological environment protection and balancing the interest relationship between the water-source area and the water-receiving area. However, there are still some deficiencies in the research on the evolutionary game analysis and the compensation behavior of stakeholders. To this end, a replication dynamic model of evolutionary game analysis was established to analyze the behavior and mutual influence of the governments of the water-source area and the water-receiving area. We examined the dynamic evolution process of each strategy, discussed the stability of the evolution result, and calculated the penalty amount of the superior supervision department through the market value method and the willingness-to-pay method. The results show that in the process of independent selection of local governments, the social optimal environmental protection strategy (protection, compensation) will not reach a balanced and stable state, and the constraint elements of the superior supervision department must be introduced. If the penalty amount is greater than the maximum value between the wealth lost in the water-source area due to ecological protection and the money the local residents in the water-receiving area is willing to pay, the optimal stability strategy can be achieved most easily. Taking Yangzhou, the water-source area of the east route of the South-to-North Water Transfer Project, and Jinan, the water-receiving area, as an example, it is calculated that the loss cost of Yangzhou is 1.304 billion RMB (USD 189 million), and Jinan is willing to pay 1.753 billion RMB (USD 254 million). Therefore, in order to stabilize the optimal strategy (protection, compensation) between the governments of Yangzhou and Jinan, the penalty amount of the superior supervision department should be greater than 1.753 billion RMB (USD 254 million). Our results could provide a reference for regulating the relationship between stakeholders and promoting the innovation of ecological compensation system for inter-basin water transfer.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call