Structuring the Organization for Large Scale Integrated Hazard Analysis

Abstract

As large scale integrated systems evolve, there is a need to adjust the organizational structure of the people developing the system to efficiently align strategy, people and functions to accomplish program objectives. One of the primary objectives for NASA programs is to ensure system safety. An effective means to accomplish this objective is the practice of embedding integrated hazard analysis (IHA) within the organizational structure to facilitate insight into system and programmatic hazards and to develop strategic mitigations. System safety should be a central focus of the organization throughout the program life cycle. Undesired consequences can occur if an organization fails to establish and maintain this focus. As stated by members of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), “In our view, the NASA organizational culture had as much to do with this accident as the foam.” The culture of an organization is influenced by its organizational structure which either encourages or hinders communication paths and imperatives for safety. Organizations that develop large scale systems have opportunities, like those provided to NASA through the CAIB report, to re-evaluate and re-align organizational structures to be more responsive to system safety considerations. In order to prevent systemic and unwarranted conflicts within the organization, the alignment should harmonize with the structures of authority, responsibility and accountability of the program. This paper suggests where the hazard analysis function should strategically reside within a typical large scale program and provides guidance that must be considered when determining the placement of the hazard analysis team within that structure.