Strategies of electricity enterprises and urban parks cooperatively investing in electric vehicle charging stations

Abstract

Cities are increasingly pursuing sustainable development. To this end, we constructed two game models of cooperation between the electricity enterprise and the urban park manager to invest in charging stations (CSs) of energy vehicles (EVs). Model A involves revenue sharing between these entities, while Model B assumes that the electricity enterprise pays site leasing fees to the urban park manager. The CS investment capacity constraint is also considered. Based on the equilibrium solution of the models, we draw the following conclusions. Firstly, when the CS investment capacity constraint is small, the CS investment amount is equal under both models, while the leasing model provides a higher charging price and lower electricity demand for CS. Secondly, when the CS investment capacity constraint is moderate, the CS investment amount under the leasing model and the charging price are higher. The electricity demand for CS is mainly affected by the revenue sharing ratio. Thirdly, when the CS investment capacity constraint is high, the CS investment amount is affected by the finding cost of CS and the charging price changes accordingly with the electricity demand for CS. Finally, a decrease in the finding cost of CS does not necessarily lead to greater investment in CSs.