Decarbonizing a supply chain with an unreliable supplier: Implications for profitability and sustainability

Abstract

The increasing emphasis on corporate social responsibility has led to a growing trend among firms to initiate decarbonization campaigns, aligning their sustainability efforts with profitability objectives. This paper explores the challenge of decarbonizing a supply chain wherein a buyer cooperates with an unreliable supplier that possesses private absorptive capacity and varying degrees of bargaining power. We develop models based on whether the absorptive capacity remains private information and whether the buyer has more bargaining power in determining the profit-maximizing price. Our findings indicate that the buyer may opt to avoid entering into contracts with the supplier for decarbonization if the absorptive capacity ratio falls below certain values. When contracting occurs, decarbonization has the potential to yield a mutually beneficial outcome for firms, customers, and the environment. Nevertheless, the presence of private information has negative implications for customers and the environment because it results in reduced consumer surplus and increased carbon footprint. As the buyer’s bargaining power strengthens, the likelihood of supply chain decarbonization increases, potentially leading to more consumer surplus and less carbon footprint. Finally, we discuss the effects of key model factors from a triple bottom line perspective (i.e., profit, people, and the planet).