Strategic stability in the twenty-first century: The challenge of the second nuclear age and the logic of stability interdependence

Abstract

ABSTRACTStrategic stability has been a core pillar of nuclear-armed states since the Cold War. Despite remaining an explicit policy preference, challenges posed by the second nuclear age make it increasingly difficult for states to establish and maintain strategic stability. These challenges are based on the growing number of nuclear-armed actors and these states' different motivations and capabilities. Additionally, new conventional weapons systems have added a new layer of complexity. The diversification of ballistic missile roles into the realm of conventional strike platforms coupled with the development of ballistic missile defense, challenges two core components of strategic stability: second-strike capability and mutual vulnerability.This article addresses these challenges and contends that strategic stability cannot be established through traditional bilateral mechanisms. It argues that states are more strategically interdependent in the second nuclear age. Therefore, they must recognize that developing and deploying these new platforms inevitably affects the nuclear and conventional deterrent capabilities of another state, undermining strategic stability.