Stock option fraud prevention in Islamic country: does corporate governance matter?

Abstract

PurposeThis paper aims to investigate the extent to which companies in one of the Islamic culture countries, Egypt, are complying with the Islamic implementation of the Anglo‐Saxon model of corporate governance and testing the impact, if any, of such compliance on mitigating of stock option fraud incentives.Design/methodology/approachA logistic regression model is used to examine the effects of board of directors, audit committee, ownership structure and other firm characteristics on the likelihood of stock option fraud. The analysis is based on the data for stock option grants obtained during the period from 2006 to 2009.FindingsThe results suggest that the rate of compliance with the Islamic implementation of the Anglo‐Saxon model of corporate governance in Egyptian public‐held companies is low. Weak corporate governance allows executives to exercise greater influence over the board of directors and audit committee decisions. Furthermore, a low level of disclosure, duality of CEO, high percentage of insiders in board of directors, auditor turnover, and management ownership are among the factors that increase the likelihood of stock option fraud in the Egyptian setting.Research limitations/implicationsThe results are constrained by the proxies used to define stock option fraud. Additionally, the limited number of companies with stock option grants in Egypt might affect the results.Originality/valueThis paper provides insights into exposing stock option fraud by Egyptian public‐held companies and sheds light on the effective role of corporate governance mechanisms to mitigate this phenomenon. This would help policy setters to enhance compliance with the Anglo‐Saxon model of corporate governance and develop a comprehensive Shari'ah model of corporate governance that reduces stock option fraud.