Standing Joint Task Forces: The Need to Man as We Plan

Abstract

Abstract : Since the inception of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, through the Quadrennial Defense Review and up to, and including, ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States military has undergone a joint transformation in the manner in which planning operations are organized. The Joint Task Force (JTF) has become the de facto standard for short/no-notice contingencies. In recent years many research studies and exercises have pointed to the concept of the Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) as the next step in the evolutionary chain from ad hoc JTFs; in the quest for truly integrated, task-oriented, rapid-reaction staffs which are able to plan at the operational level. In this study, I theorize that the Standing Joint Task Force concept, though a step in the right direction, is not enough. Further, if a more in-depth, disciplined approach towards manpower is not taken the SJTF is marginalized to a good on paper' approach, but practically speaking, not much better than previous ad hoc Joint Task Forces. Unless the resource manpower', which is the genesis to all operational art designs, is managed more efficiently, the resulting plans and execution will see less than optimal results. The military is adamant in its resolve to train as we fight'; this paper suggests that it would be well served to also man as we plan'.