Stabilizing post-conflict states: evaluating the impact of resources

Abstract

Listen

Translate article

ABSTRACT Some studies suggest that rebel groups, militias, or insurgents end in post-conflict states because of carefully planned disarmament, demobilization, and integration into existing or new state political processes. However, there are still many cases in which these steps have not always led to stabilization, allowing armed groups to continue to operate and build resources. For this study, we specifically ask why this might be the case and what encourages groups to continue growing their structure rather than negotiating or integrating it into post-conflict state structures. Through our research, we have found and argued that insurgents are more amenable to entering negotiations with or transitioning into state organizations if they have weak resources. Our analysis indicates that resources in the form of revenue from taxation and public support through service provision positively impact an insurgent group’s strength, thereby forgoing and dissuading any efforts to disarm, demobilize, and integrate into the state’s political process. Our results, pertaining to active groups from 1945 to 2013, are consistent when testing insurgencies globally and in South America. Our findings include an illustrative case study of Colombia, Iraq, and a regression analysis has been performed by combining the robust Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan Non-State Actor dataset and Huang’s Rebel Governance Dataset.