Sprawiedliwość polityczna a neutralność. Kilka uwag o rozumnej naturze liberalizmu politycznego Johna Rawlsa i Charlesa Larmore’a

Abstract

Two fundamental features of a liberal political community are usually identified in contemporary deliberations: (1) there is an inevitable pluralism of visions of good and worthy life, blended into a wide range of religious, philosophical and ethical positions; (2) those who are in power are under an obligation to set public matters in such a way as to avoid discrimination of any class of the ruled. In respect of (1) and (2), it is presumed that the process of enacting, implementing and executing public law shall be separated from any perfectionist moral position, because being impartial when making political decisions is a prerequisite for non-discriminatory politics. This kind of politics looks for proper, convincing and comprehensible reasons to establish a new legal standard of behaviour in the ‘public reason’ – a set of moral statements and political values commonly shared in an open, pluralistic and tolerant society, which does not provide decisive answers to any questions about the meaning of life and does not bring us closer to discover its ideal. This article tries to reproduce the main notions and ideas of leading, contemporary liberal philosophers – John Rawls and Charles Larmore – that deal with the very nature of impartiality of a liberal state and the ability of policymakers to be impartial. It also presents the critical views of Stephen Macedo and Nicholas Wolterstorff, who question the possibility of building a neutral state.