Public Reason

Abstract

Doubts about the possibility of shared public rationality and reasons derive from a variety of sources: social science, the philosophy of science, and the moral pluralism of modern societies. Although these cast doubt on the Enlightenment's ideal of a common universal reason, they pose different challenges. The findings of anthropology question universal norms of rationality; psychology questions whether universal norms are actually employed in human reasoning. Kuhnian philosophy of science suggests an indeterminancy of general standards, even in science itself. Worries about reasonable pluralism focus on the difficulty of obtaining shared moral and political norms in pluralistic societies. Just as the challenges to public reason arise from multiple sources, so do theories of public reason. Epistemic theories maintain that although some divergence in justified norms of reasoning no doubt occurs, radical divergence is implausible.Consensus theories of public reason maintain that to make sense to each other we must think alike. The application of such common rules, say neo-Wittgensteinians, only makes sense in the context of shared social practices. Lastly, political liberalism seeks to establish that, amid the diversity of moral and philosophical views that characterize modern societies, a common political point of view can generate shared public reasons to regulate coercion.