Space as a warfighting domain: Reshaping policy to execute 21st century spacepower

A changing balance of power between Washington and Beijing has dominated discourse on regional and global trends in both academic and policy circles. While ample body of literature deals with the question of deterrence vis-a-vis the US and China, less attention is given to medium powers in the Asia Pacific regarding their policy decisions to adapt to a dynamic balance of power. This paper looks at how two key regional players, Taiwan and Japan, have shifted their strategic perceptions from territorial defense to a more active deterrence regarding the PRC. It gives an overview of the state of the theory of deterrence in IR and Security Studies literature, followed by an assessment of changing Chinese military capabilities. It then shows the strategic perceptions and expressed intentions of Japanese and Taiwanese defense reforms that highlight deterrence as a core concept. The two regional actors’ deterrence strategies share core similarities and represent special cases of deterrence thinking that can contribute to theoretical analysis of deterrence strategy in the 21st century

The aim of this article is to highlight important factors neglected in modelling the effects of deterrent policies on thieves' activities in the real world. The methodology adopted consists of defining a world with three continuous spaces. Space in the centre has no institutions and no production. Only the other two spaces have institutions and are places for production. The study uses the Tullock contest fonction for n-players developed by Jia (2012) to identify thieves' efforts and the institutions' endowments at equilibrium. In contrast to the existing literature, our results indicate a perverse, indirect effect of institutions' deterrence strategies on thieves' activities and a negative effect of an increase in institutional deterrence on the total proportion of production stolen. This outcome therefore supports deterrence policies. Symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable when institutions have different production levels. However, we note that asymmetric equilibrium remains optimal, even in situations of differences in production across institutions. A confrontation between thieves from different areas can be a way for an institution to provide less deterrence in an asymmetric balance while guaranteeing a higher level of consumption than that under the opposing institution.

The article examines the correlation between deterrence and coercion strategies as tools of modern diplomacy. The transformation of the deterrence strategy from post-war times to the present is traced. A comparative analysis of deterrence and coercion strategies is carried out.

This was the fourth in a series of annual events convened at Livermore to exploring the emerging place of the “new domains” in U.S. deterrence strategies. The purposes of the series are to facilitate the emergence of a community of interest that cuts across the policy, military, and technical communities and to inform laboratory strategic planning. U.S. allies have also been drawn into the conversation, as U.S. deterrence strategies are in part about their protection. Discussion in these workshops is on a not-for-attribution basis. It is also makes no use of classified information. On this occasion, there were nearly 100 participants from a dozen countries.

In industrial applications of machinery fault diagnostics, transfer learning is often used to transfer the knowledge learned from the source domain including labeled data to the target domain containing unlabeled data. This method follows the assumption that the label space in the source and target domain is the same. However, the label space of the target domain may be unknown in reality. For ensuring the integrity of knowledge, labeled data with all common fault types are considered as the source domain. However, if the label space of the target domain is less than that of the source domain, the negative effect from outlier classes will influence the performance. For solving this problem, a reconstruction domain adaptation transfer network (RDATN) is proposed. RDATN mainly contains health condition recognition and domain adaptation. The former is constructed for health condition recognition, while another one contributes to extracting domain-invariant features. Additionally, for reducing negative effects from outlier classes, a class-level weight and a sample-level weight are applied in the loss function. To improve the performance, particle swarm optimization (PSO) is applied to search for initial parameters for RDATN. The superiority of the proposed model is verified through three bearing datasets in two experiments.

The paper critiques the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a nuclear-armed alliance, exploring whether enlargement provoked Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the role of deterrence in conflict escalation. Despite NATO's efforts to bolster Ukraine’s defenses without direct intervention, questions remain about the effectiveness of its deterrence strategy. Public opinion shifts in Sweden and Finland toward NATO membership after Russia’s actions highlight broader implications for European security. The paper also assesses the non-implementation of the Minsk agreements, exploring missed opportunities for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. By examining these dynamics, it contributes to debates on NATO's future, the efficacy of nuclear deterrence, and the prospects for cooperative security amidst escalating global tensions.

Despite decades of research on coercive diplomacy, the linkage between deterrence and compellence still remains unexplored. The present essay provides both a theoretical and empirical analysis of why studying their linked relationship is desirable. After overviewing the literature, it investigates the interplay between US strategies of deterrence and compellence in the First Gulf Crisis (1990–1991), suggesting that the deterrence–compellence linkage is stronger when the two strategies coexist or after they have coexisted. In particular, such a linkage was absent at the beginning of the First Gulf Crisis but very much present from the middle of the crisis until its end. Although this essay represents only a preliminary foray into exploring the potential linkage between deterrence and compellence, it appears that a better grasp of this relationship could provide us with the tools to counteract as well as reduce the negative effects of miscalculation and misperception, practices that are partially responsible for unpredicted and unwanted outcomes in international politics.

In seismic data acquisition, because of several factors, such as surface barriers, receiver failure, noise contamination and budget control, seismic records often exhibit irregular sampling in the space domain. As corrupted seismic records have a negative effect on seismic migration, inversion and interpretation, seismic trace interpolation is a key step in seismic data pre‐processing. In this paper, we propose a high‐efficiency and high‐precision seismic trace interpolation method for irregularly spatially sampled data by combining an extreme gradient boosting decision tree and principal component analysis in a semi‐supervised learning method. The adjacent trace number, sampling number and amplitudes of the effective seismic data were taken as features to build the training data set for the extreme gradient boosting decision tree. Principal component analysis is applied to remove redundant information and accelerate the training speed. This is different from the traditional trace interpolation method in that the proposed method is data‐driven; therefore, it does not require any assumptions. Compared with other deep learning‐based trace interpolation methods, the proposed method has fewer control parameters and learning labels and a smaller training cost. Experiments using synthetic and field data demonstrated the validity and flexibility of this trace interpolation method.

This article argues that in the unique physical and operational environment of outer space, offensive operations hold intrinsic advantages over defensive ones. Drawing upon classical military theorists such as Clausewitz and Corbett, the author contends that the traditional dominance of the defensive form of war—rooted in terrestrial conditions—does not extend to celestial conflict. The transparency and remoteness of the space domain neutralize key defensive benefits, such as proximity to supply bases, concealment, and fortified positions, while also diminishing the factors that typically cause terrestrial offensives to culminate. Consequently, space conflict favors the side that seizes and maintains the initiative through offensive action. The article introduces the concept of a “parallel offensive,” whereby defense in space is achieved not through passive fortification but through immediate, coordinated counterattacks that contest the adversary’s initiative. Although an offensive advantage in space may challenge strategic stability and increase first-strike incentives, it need not make war inevitable. Through deterrence strategies, cross-domain integration, and arms control measures, states can mitigate these destabilizing effects. The study thus redefines the logic of “space defense” as an inherently active, offense-oriented enterprise.

The great transformation in world politics during the 21st century is considered with a particular focus on the Western dominance vis-à-vis challenges and strategies adopted by emerging powers. This study aims to unravel the historical underpinnings of Western expansionism, explore the dynamics between the status quo and revisionism, and trace the evolution of the modern global order. Special emphasis is placed on analyzing case studies of Russia, China, and Türkiye to understand their respective approaches to world politics and shape it. Russia pursues a multi-polar world and employs revisionist policies inspired by its Soviet and Tsarist-era dominance, particularly through deterrence strategies in security, energy, nuclear plants. China proposes interconnectivity in world governance through dependency and network policies, most significantly exemplified by the economic policies through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and multi-billion projects as an economic power all over the world. Lastly, Türkiye, despite lacking economic and security power compared to China and Russia, leverages its historical influence from the Ottoman Empire, religious discourse in the Islamic world, Turkic identity in Central Asia and strong modernization process through the part of Western institutions such as NATO and EU accession process, employing diplomatic power as a key tool. Analyzing these cases separately and collectively is benefited from the grand strategy concept and comparative politics method. In summary, this research seeks to contribute to our understanding of the evolving dynamics of world politics in the 21st century. By conceptualization through the historical events, contemporary trends, and case studies of major powers, the study aims to shed light on the complex interplay between Western hegemony and emerging powers for world order.

Asia requires management in areas that interface, including manufacturing and assembly of goods, quality control, transportation of raw materials, delivery of finished products to markets, protecting intellectual property, providing services. Some management should be domestic, subject to different traditions and values within each country. Domestic Asian management, even pan-Asian management, is not working optimally. A “Chingbirok” or “Book of Corrections” seems required. Implicitly, this is an invitation for foreign partners to join into this conversation, because the welfare of all nations concerned depends upon effective and efficient management of Asia, especially the economies of populous Asian countries themselves. Actual and rhetorical belligerence should subside, Sino-American and Sino-European investment should be optimised, freedom of maritime navigation maintained through deterrence strategies. This paper will outline essentially an Anglo-American plan to secure a competitive maritime corridor across the “Near” Seas from Japan through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean, an overland railway and highway across the Russian Federation, plus an alternative seaway across the Arctic Ocean, rendered navigable by global warming. America’s primary responsibility may focus on protecting Taiwan plus East Asian countries, with Britain’s to concentrate on safeguarding the Indian subcontinent and Malaysia as its former colonies. Functionally, the United Kingdom and United States should assume a proactive role in providing investment and oversight across China’s “New Silk Road” to ensure harmony and deter the outbreak of hostilities within Eurasia, exerting muscular intervention in cooperation with their Asian Allies as required. Concrete objectives should be to maintain self-governance of Taiwan and all Asian states, unfettered South China Sea navigation, preservation of Western technology from Chinese plunder or coerced acquisition, together with an opportunity for a rising Asian middle class to purchase Western goods without restriction, each a component of America’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Strategy articulated by President Donald J. Trump.

The South China Sea is known as the second busiest sea lane in the world after the Suez Canal in Egypt, this area also has an abundance of living creatures and has large oil and natural gas reserves. Because of its potential, the area is still a contest for claims between several countries. Currently, it is known that the United States and China are the largest hegemonic countries in the economic field that are fighting for power in the South China Sea region. Some experts even discussed the possibility of competition that will end with war or military conflict in the 21st century. As a result of this tension, other countries in Southeast Asia which are generally not superpowers have put themselves in a situation that is called a security dilemma. Indonesia is not a claimant country in the South China Sea area but has sovereignty near the area which is Natuna Island. If there is a conflict between the United State and China in the South China Sea area, it will have direct implications for the sovereignty of the Indonesian state in Natuna. To deal with this scenario, Indonesia must prepare its defense forces. In this security dilemma situation, Indonesia is strengthening its military and making alliances with other countries that also do not want conflict or war, Indonesia also trying to balance its power with China and the United States with the balance of power strategy. The aim of this article is to describe whether the balance of power strategy that has been carried out by Indonesia is successful as a deterrence strategy.

: As the United States attempts to adapt to meet the changing conditions of the twenty-first century, organizational structure is an issue of heated debate. The central issue of the debate is whether the Army's current hierarchical structure will be effective in a twenty-first century environment. Many argue that efficiencies through technological improvement have eliminated the need for many headquarters. However, in October 1998 the United States Army activated a new theater level air defense headquarters, the 32nd Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC). This monograph examines whether the AAMDC is necessary for theater Army air and missile defense in a Force 21 environment. The monograph begins by examining the future environment in which theater air defense operations will occur. The Army's Force 21 operational concepts establish the foundation for future air defense operations. The future air threat and counterair doctrine are also discussed. Two alternative organizations are then explained. The alternative organizations are the new AAMDC organization and its immediate predecessor, the echelon above corps Air Defense Artillery brigade. Next, evaluation criteria are established. The criteria are command and control, planning, coordination, and acceptability. The analysis is the preponderance of the work. Finally, the monograph concludes that the AAMDC is for effective theater Army air and missile defense operations.

The Russia-Ukraine War is still rolling today, potential and factual threats can make the war even more late. In building a defense and security system the best can be done by studying the history of battles in the past. One of them is the Battle of Normandy which was fought by America and its allies with Germany in northern France. This article aims to gain benefits to build a better strategy for sea defense operations from the events of the Battle of Normandy and the Russia-Ukraine war. The method used is qualitative by using literature as a source of data. The results of the analysis and discussion carried out on these two events, the researcher found that both carried out the concept of implementing the Indirect Approach strategy echoed by Sir Basil Liddell Hart in which Ukraine carried out an unexpected attack on the Russian cruiser, Moskva, which caused the sinking the ship. So that the concept of the Indirect approach strategy carried out by America and its allies in the 2nd World War is still relevant to strategic maritime defense operations in the 21st century.

: The 21st Century will be an era of persistent, full-spectrum conflict ranging from peaceful competition to general war. Military conflict in this era will encompass the full spectrum of operations to include offensive, defensive, and stability operations. In the past decade the Army has demonstrated its competence in offensive and defensive operations, but has struggled to develop competency in stability operations. The Army must develop a core competency in stability operations equal to that which it currently has in combat operations. To do this, the Army must determine jurisdiction over the tasks inherent in the mission as a means of identifying where in the Institution the skills and expertise reside. The paper will identify that these tasks require skill and expertise that are resident in certain Army branches. The Army must assess its strategic leadership capacity in those branches to determine whether core competency can be claimed. The paper takes the position that current strategic leadership is not sufficiently diverse in the professional skills and expertise that stability operations require. The Army should address the challenge of attaining core competency in stability operations by se? solutions through the Army Enterprise.