Soviet Strategy in Southeast Asia: The Vietnam Factor

Abstract

The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the consequent conflict between China and Vietnam has yielded significant strategic gains for the Soviet Union. In less than five years it has become a major military power in Southeast Asia, a near equal to the U.S. Through Vietnam, the Soviets have acquired the use of three military bases and an ally that is a powerful military force in its own right, with one of the largest armies in the world. Although the alliance was formed out of mutual need-Vietnam needed the USSR in order to take control of Indochina and the USSR needed the Vietnamese expansion to extend its influence in Southeast Asia-this is not an alliance of equals, since Vietnam has become militarily and economically dependent on the Soviet Union. For the first time in its history, the Vietnamese Communist Party's espousal of socialism is linked less with an assertion of national independence and more with solidarity with a foreign power. The consequences of Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea for Vietnam itself and for Southeast Asia as a whole cannot be understood apart from Soviet strategy in the region. This strategy is examined here through a brief survey of the history of Soviet-Vietnamese relations and an examination of Vietnam's current military and economic relations with the Soviet Union.