South Korean Perceptions of Unification: Evidence from an Experimental Survey

Abstract

South Korean Perceptions of UnificationEvidence from an Experimental Survey Timothy S. Rich (bio) Since the historic meeting in April 2018 between South Korean president Moon Jae-In and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, several confidence-building measures across the Korean Peninsula suggest the possibility of peaceful relations and perhaps a path toward eventual unification. Questions regarding perceptions of unification are ubiquitous in South Korean survey research, showing that most South Koreans support unification. For example, data from the Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) from 2003 to 2012 consistently shows large majorities (67+ percent) stating that unification is somewhat or very necessary, with variation based on age and political ideology.1 Likewise, survey data from the Asan Institute from 2011 to 2014 finds similar majorities (70+ percent) that express their interest in reunification, with respondents in Asan's 2010 survey expressing a slight majority (52.6 percent), even after the sinking of the South Korean submarine Cheonan, which was attributed to a North Korean torpedo.2 While many factors—from ethnic motivations, to concerns of the short-term economic factors, to the long-term economic potential of a united Korea—likely influence desires for unification, these motivations provide little information about issues related to unification. This analysis addresses two unification-related questions. One, to what extent is support for unification contingent on more concrete factors, such as costs and internal migration? Two, to what extent do South Koreans expect unification in the short term? Despite a large literature on both South Korean public opinion and how framing and priming affects perceptions and attitudes across contexts, remarkably few efforts attempt to systematically connect how framing and priming in surveys potentially influence perceptions of North Korea. To address these questions, I embedded two experimental questions within an original web survey conducted in South Korea in November 2018, allowing for an explicit test of the extent to which word choice—in terms of how unification is presented in surveys—influences public perceptions. This article will first summarize literature on unification, introduce framing and priming and its potential implications for South Korean public opinion, and provide a brief research design. Empirical analysis will show the limited effects of framing on support for unification, call into question whether costs and migration undermine support for unification, and demonstrate that expectations that unification will occur increase when presented with longer time horizons. The findings suggest the durability of unification sentiment and potential avenues to support unification sentiment. More surprisingly, survey results find that South Koreans who [End Page 142] believe North Korea has a right to nuclear weapons consistently support unification, which calls into question whether the North Korean nuclear program counterintuitively promotes a future unified Korea. Previous Research While public opinion research consistently finds majorities in support of unification, several factors influence support. For example, existing work finds that South Koreans frequently focus on the costs of unification more than the benefits of unification, with concerns particularly focused on long-term economic development and the logistics of political and social integration.3 This should not be surprising considering the wide variations in estimates of unification costs, ranging from billions to over $10 trillion depending on whether infrastructure, humanitarian, and educational costs are included,4 estimates which are further complicated by debates on what countries and non-state actors will contribute to Korean unification.5 The growing economic divergence of the two Koreas further exacerbates concerns of cost, while younger generations of South Koreans exhibit declining interest in unification as well.6 Likewise, the role of North Korean refugees likely influences South Korean support for unification.7 The broader literature on immigration, which focuses on crime, economic competition, and cultural distinctions, would also seem to apply to South Korean views on North Korean refugees, and thus, by extension influence views on unification.8 North Korean refugees not only receive various forms of resettlement packages, but also compete with unskilled South Koreans for jobs. Meanwhile, evidence suggests that South Koreans who score high on ethnic identity are more likely to both view North Korean migrants negatively and be less supportive of unification.9 Furthermore, security concerns likely influence perceptions of unification. Previous research indicates that, other than...