Solving the Strategic Equation: Integrating Missile Defense and Conventional Weapons in U.S.–Russian Arms Control

Abstract

With the New START treaty extension, Moscow and Washington are on course for new arms control negotiations. The unprecedented breadth of the strategic bilateral agenda issues means that any future talks would entail extensive linkages and trade-off s in various spheres. The article explores two of the domains that would inevitably have to be addressed in future negotiations – missile defense and strategic conventional weapons. Missile defense was an integral part of U.S.–Russian arms control from early on, most prominently reflected in the ABM treaty of 1972. However, a deep look into the current state and trajectory of U.S. missile defense developments suggests that instead of focusing on the “strategic” interceptors in the continental U.S., the aim should be on regulating new mobile systems, which pose a more significant threat to the strategic stability and might be more amenable to limitations. Strategic conventional weapons are less clearly defined, and there is less arms control experience with dealing with them. On occasions where they were subject to arms control regulations, they were either banned or included in the strategic nuclear forceslimits. With many types of strategic conventional weapons, it does not seem that a one-size-fits-all approach is feasible. Some of the newer systems might remain too niche to have an impact on strategic stability. With the most ubiquitous strategic conventional weapons – long-range cruise missiles – a framework of asymmetric limits might be considered.