Social Origins of Nuclear Policy: A Niebuhrian Dilemma of the U.S. Policies toward North Korea

IntroductionGiven the gravity and urgency of North Korean issues, the U.S. cannot avoid addressing highly uncertain prospects in the North. Although Korea is a middle-sized country-the North and South Koreas together are roughly the same size as Britain and have a combined population of 70 million, Koreans feel small because they live amid giants. Their geopolitical neighbors are China, Japan, Russia, and America, whose spheres of influence overlap in Korea. As a result, the peninsula has been over the past 50 years the site of recurrent collisions between great power interests.Ever since the Korean War, two rival governments, communist in the North and capitalist in the South, have been locked in mortal combat. Half a century later, there is still no peace on the horizon. By American estimates, North Korea has i.i million troops; South Korea has 700,000, which, however, are augmented by 37,000 American armed forces. All men have military experience, and millions (the number of reserve troops is 4.7 million in North Korea and 4.5 million in South Korea) are eligible for call-up in case of war (Kim, 2003, pp. 8-9). Since Kim Il Sung died of a heart attack on July 8, 1994, the future of North Korea became the core of Northeast Asian security issues. Arguments focus on North Korea's current situation, policy directions, and the results of its policies.The U.S. has recently questioned how to confront sponsoring terrorism and developing weapons of mass destruction. Policymakers face two choices: engagement or confrontation. In the past, the Clinton administration had engaged with North Korea to prevent its development of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The Bush administration quickly put North Korean relations on hold until a policy review was conducted. By early July 200i, the new administration's policy, under the influence of Colin Powell, validated a continuation of the U.S.-North Korean dialogue. However, North Korea expressed strong concern through other channels that the Bush administration operated under a di∂erent and more di[double dagger]cult set of principles than the Clinton administration. North Korea's view of the Bush administration's tougher line on relations was validated in 2002. In the past, the U.S. State Department had labeled North Korea, Iraq, and Iran as rogue states whose military policy and support of other groups threatened Washington's security. In his State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, however, Bush labeled Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an axis of evil, thus extending his war on terrorism. A series of one-sided hard-line actions taken by both sides since then has caused their relationship to deteriorate along the following pathway: engagement [arrow right] containment [arrow right] confrontation [arrow right] regional crisis [arrow right] international crisis. Consequently, daily headlines about this newly strained relationship between the two old enemies filled the news media around the world though this stando∂ has been somewhat overshadowed by the Iraq war since March 2003.In our dialogue, we will first discuss North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Second, we will analyze four ways of dealing with the nuclear deadlock, backing our views with a survey of MBA students. Third, we will argue why the U.S. should publicly announce its clear-cut position on North Korea's nuclear program once and for all. Finally, we will argue why engagement is the only viable option to resolve the latest altercation between the U.S and North Korea on nuclear weapons.North Korean Nuclear Weapons ProgramIn i989, it became undeniably obvious that North Korea was assembling the elements of a nuclear weapons program. However, its nuclear technology emerged as early as the late i950s; the program gained momentum in the i960s and again in the mid-i980s. North Korea initially obtained a small research reactor from the Soviet Union and later began construction on a larger reactor at the Yongbyon site. …

The second North Korean nuclear crisis, which was triggered by controversy over its alleged highly enriched uranium (HEU) program in October 2002, continues. Despite its roller-coaster trajectory, the Six Party Talks (6PT) process has paved the way for a peaceful diplomatic settlement of the nuclear standoff. Since the 6PT process has been primarily a negotiating arena for North Korea and the United States, through the mediation of China, room for South Korea's effective participation has been structurally limited. Nevertheless, the Roh Moo Hyun government played a significant role in suggesting innovative ideas, often defying the American stance to break impasses, and facilitating the overall process of negotiation through proactive diplomacy. This article unravels the Roh government's diplomatic role in the 6PT process by describing its initial perception of and reactions to U.S. positions on contentious issues such as the terms of engagement and exchange, and analyzing its role in linking the 6PT to a peace regime for Korea and a Northeast Asian regional security and peace mechanism. Key words: South Korea, multilateral security - East Asia, North Korea, nuclear weapons Introduction: The Second Nuclear Crisis Controversy over the highly enriched uranium (HEU) program in North Korea, which surfaced during U.S. special envoy James Kelly's visit to Pyongyang in October 2002, triggered the second nuclear crisis between North Korea and the United States. It was through the Six Party Talks (6PT) process that the nuclear stand-off began to show prospects for a peaceful settlement through diplomatic negotiations. But as with most negotiations with North Korea, the 6PT process, which has been underway since 2003, has been protracted, frustrating, and unpredictable. The first three rounds (2003-2004) of the 6PT did not produce any tangible outcome. The uncompromising attitudes of North Korea and the United States almost derailed the talks, particularly when the North declared its possession of nuclear weapons in February 2005 and refused to attend the talks indefinitely. A major breakthrough came during the fourth round with the adoption of the September 19, 2005 joint statement. However, the freeze of North Korean bank accounts at the Banco Delta Asia on September 20, 2005 and the North's subsequent provocative reactions- such as its missile tests on July 5 and underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006-eroded the very foundation of the 6PT. After a series of direct contacts between the United States and North Korea in early 2007, the 6PT were resumed and began to make concrete progress. The 6PT adopted the February 13 and the October 3 agreements for shutting down and sealing the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, disabling those facilities, identifying nuclear materials and programs, and ultimately, verifiably dismantling all nuclear programs and materials, including nuclear weapons. The first phase of shutting down and sealing has been completed at this writing, and the second phase of disabling and declaration is also coming to an end as the United States removed North Korea from its list of terrorist-sponsoring states. The last phase of verifiable dismantling, however, is encountering formidable challenges. The 6PT process has been a negotiating arena for North Korea and the United States, through the mediation of China. Room for South Korea's participation has been structurally limited. But the South Korean government has played a significant role in suggesting innovative ideas, breaking occasional impasses, and facilitating the overall process of negotiation through proactive diplomacy. A growing body of literature on the second North Korean nuclear crisis and the 6PT process has failed to pay attention to the South Korean role, being preoccupied instead with analyzing negotiations between Pyongyang and Washington.1 This article fills the gap by delineating and explaining South Korea's diplomatic efforts in the 6PT process. …

Note: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, the Department of Defense or any other government agency. The Agreed Framework Between the United States and the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) is in our interest because, if it is carried out, it will eliminate the North Korean nuclear weapons program. If unchecked, this program threatens two key U.S. interests stability in Asia and checking the spread of nuclear weapons. The stability of Asia is critical to U.S. security and prosperity. The foundation of Northeast Asia's economic growth and political stability is security, and the linchpins of security have been our commitment to our defense relationships with South Korea and Japan. North Korea's long-standing challenge to security and stability in Northeast Asia acquired more ominous dimension with the emergence of major North Korean nuclear weapons program. Since the early 1980s, North Korea has operated large nuclear complex, chiefly at Yongbyon. U.S. intelligence believes that the purpose of the complex is the production of weapons grade plutonium. In addition to small 5 MW(e) reactor in operation since 1985, 50 MW(e) and 200 MW(e) reactor are under construction. We estimate that the DPRK nuclear program had generated enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons and was poised to leap forward in terms of plutonium production. The North Korean program represented an unacceptable threat to the United States' and our allies' interests for number of mutually-reinforcing reasons: * An unchecked nuclear capability in the North, coupled with its oversized conventional force, could be used for extortion or blackmail against the ROK as well as greatly increasing the costs of war in Korea. * A nuclear arsenal in North Korea could ignite nuclear arms race in Asia generally. * Failure to curb North Korean efforts would undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. * North Korea could export nuclear technologies and components to pariah states or terrorists worldwide. * With upgraded missile delivery systems, which the North is developing, the nuclear threat could project across most of Northeast Asia. The DPRK signed the NPT in 1985, entered into safeguards agreement with the IAEA in January 1992 and agreed with the ROK in 1992 to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Despite these obligations, in 1989 the DPRK defueled its 5 MW(e) reactor and reprocessed the fuel. In 1992 the DPRK refused to cooperate with the IAEA to clarify the amount and disposition of the plutonium from that load of fuel. The DPRK remained out of compliance with its NPT and IAEA obligations up to mid-1994. Talks aimed at the resolution of the problem faltered. In 1993 North Korea announced it would withdraw from the NPT and then suspended its withdrawal. In June 1994 the DPRK defueled its reactor for the second time and refused to allow the IAEA to take steps that could have helped shed light on the amount of plutonium removed during the earlier defueling. It declared it would end its IAEA safeguards agreement, refuel the reactor, and reprocess the spent fuel. In light of these threats, acts, and the lack of progress in bilateral talks, the United States, in cooperation with the ROK and other allies and friends, took steps to obtain UN Security Council sanctions resolution on the DPRK. North Korea declared that sanctions were, in its view, an act of war. In light of the DPRK's massive conventional capability and its threats e.g. to turn Seoul into a sea of fire we augmented our defensive capability, and in consultation with the ROK, considered wide range of options for additional force augmentations. …

The North Korean nuclear problem has gradually deteriorated in the past two decades and is becoming increasingly serious.1 Over the course of this worsening crisis, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has staged three nuclear tests and continues to develop its diverse medium- and long-range missile capabilities. North Korea now claims to be a nuclear weapons state and has formally announced its byungjin policy, which aims for the simultaneous pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic development.2 Pyongyang is clearly determined to develop advanced nuclear capabilities and time is running short for the international community to respond. Despite this, diplomatic initiatives aimed at denuclearizing North Korea have thus far been ineffective. Policymakers have bought the same horse three times by attempting, and ultimately failing, to resolve the problem through the Geneva Agreed Framework (October 1994), the September 19th agreement (September 2005), and the leap day agreement (February 2012). Likewise, the six-party talks aimed at peaceful denuclearization of North Korea-involving Russia, China, the DPRK, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, and the United States-have in essence stalled. Considering the rate at which North Korea's nuclear program is advancing, it is urgent that the international community adopt a more effective approach soon.This essay explores why efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis have been unsuccessful and attempts to outline a more effective approach. The first section examines Pyongyang's inconsistent justifications for the program, as well as its perspectives and motivations regarding denuclearization. Next, the essay assesses the obstacles hindering the international community's efforts toward the denuclearization of North Korea. Last, this essay argues that the nuclear problem is rooted in the nature of the North Korean regime and considers strategies necessary for resolving the crisis. The essay concludes by recommending a more enduring, holistic, and comprehensive approach focused on strengthening deterrence capabilities and gradually altering North Korea's current trajectory through increased engagement.North Korea's Claims for Nuclearization and Understanding of DenuclearizationNorth Korea's actions over time and inconsistent justifications for its nuclear program indicate an unwillingness to denuclearize. Commencing in the late 1950s, North Korea's nuclear program was ostensibly for research purposes and energy generation. Thus, the DPRK asked for compensation for terminating its program in the 1990s, and a coalition of countries agreed to the provision of light-water reactors and heav y-fuel oil under the 1994 Agreed Framework.3 When North Korea's uranium enrichment program was discovered in 2002, Pyongyang denied the program's existence. However, it later acknowledged the continuation of the program and withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2003 to pursue its nuclear ambitions (the first and only signatory country to the NPT to do so). At the same time, North Korea has been developing its missile capabilities. Since the summer of 1998, outside observers have witnessed the country's development of medium- and long-range missiles such as the Musudan, Taepodong-1, and Taepodong-2 missiles.4 As North Korea's nuclear weapons capabilities have evolved, Pyongyang has increasingly argued that its nuclear program is intended to be a deterrent against a potential preemptive attack by the United States.The key to understanding North Korea's changing stance on its nuclear program is comprehending how Pyongyang views the issue of denuclearization: when North Korea speaks of denuclearization, it means for the entire Korean Peninsula. In essence, its actions to this end would be conditional upon the United States no longer providing a nuclear umbrella over South Korea. Beyond this, North Korea has demanded a U.S. …

IntroductionI have repeatedly pointed out the adverse impact of numerous U.S. economic sanctions on North Korea's trade. I have written, for instance, that the large trade deficit, unless compensated somehow, is not sustainable.1 Further, since China and were the only two steady importers of North Korean products from 2000 to 2005, if one or both countries turned against North Korea by joining the economic sanctions, it would be difficult for North Korea not to feel the impact. And so it came to be. Japan rapidly tightened its economic relations with North Korea during the past year or two, I wrote in 2007, a total ban of imports from North Korea, over the issues of kidnapping and nuclear weapons, leaving China as the only country that has a key influence on North Korea's trade. Prospects are that North Korea's exports may decline, making North Korea's trade deficit issue even more difficult.2 Even with these premonitions, it was a pleasant surprise to see the way in which North Korea responded to the nuclear talks later in 2007.The objective of this paper is to explore the economic reasons behind North Korea's positive response to the nuclear talks in 2007, by hypothesizing that the North Korean leaders altered their approach partly because of the adverse impact of economic sanctions on North Korea's trade that had reached an unsustainable stage, and partly because of a greater calculation of benefits and costs by the North Korean leaders since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the process of which began in 1989.Key Economic Sanctions against North KoreaThe economic sanctions that have been imposed against North Korea since the beginning of the Korean War in 1950 are chronologically explained elsewhere by me.3 Among the many sanctions imposed on North Korea are three that currently have a direct impact on North Korea's trade. One is the U.S. denial of a most-favored nation (MFN) trade status on North Korea's exports, which was imposed on September 1, 1951. Because of the widespread use of the MFN tariffs, these are known as Normal Trade Relations (NTR) tariffs. Without MFN status, tariffs on North Korean exports to the United States can be so high that it would be impossible for North Korea to even consider exporting anything to the United States.Another important sanction was levied when North Korean agents blew up Korean Air 858 on November 29, 1987, when the plane was on its way from Baghdad to Bangkok. The explosion killed 115 passengers and crew members. On January 20, 1988, North Korea was placed on a list of countries that support international terrorism, on the basis of the U.S. Export Administration Act of 1979. The importance of this sanction is that placement on the list made it impossible for North Korea to borrow development funds from international financial institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.4The third key economic sanctions may be termed collectively the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative, announced by President George W. Bush in May 2003, which is designed to interdict weapons of mass destruction shipments to and from countries of proliferation concern, such as North Korea.5 Ever since President Bush labeled North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as an axis of evil in his State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, there had been a gradual tightening of sanctions until 2007. The October 2002 discovery of North Korea's nuclear program, and North Korea's subsequent announcement that it was renewing the program, broke the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework, and led to a rapid downturn in the relations between North Korea and the United States. The worsening relations were followed by a broad tightening of North Korea's illegal financial transactions. The broad tightening culminated in Banco Delta Asia's termination of business dealings with North Korea as of February 16, 2006. Banco Delta Asia had long been suspected of handling North Korea's illicit activities overseas, such as laundering of counterfeit U. …

This article explains that key to understanding North Korean nuclear weapons motivations is the application of the explanatory frameworks of constructivism, liberalism, and realism to different time periods in North Korea: 1964 to 1994 (realism), 1991 to 2007 (liberalism), and 1991, 1994, and 2011 (constructivism). Notably, these periods coincide with the perceived security threat from South Korean-based U.S. nuclear arms until the erosion of Soviet support, the North Korean economic crisis and the value of nuclear weapons as an international-aid bargaining chip, and the expedience of nuclear disarmament. A realist approach toward North Korea from the 1990s to the present would be counterproductive, as the state has hardened itself against its adversaries and simultaneously needs economic and civil aid.

Delineating the impact of North Korea's program on overall military spending among the other principal states of Northeast Asia is challenging. This article presents a foundation to address that challenge. After summarizing key elements of North Korea's program, the article introduces frameworks to examine the security consequences of the program for the Northeast Asian region and assess North Korea's motivations to pursue capabilities. The reviews indicate how these frameworks can be used to deduce hypotheses of more specific linkages of North Korea's activities to other states' military spending decisions, some strategically motivated and others more influenced by symbolism and domestic politics. The article concludes with observations on contemporary developments derived from the analysis. Key words: North Korea, weapons, East Asian security, Northeast Asia, military spending Introduction This article addresses the impact of the North Korean program on military spending among the principal states of Northeast Asia.1 A single empirical relationship is difficult to discern with precision because of the multiplicity of factors involved. North Korea's ambitions have many potential sources and several categories of consequences, suggesting varying interpretations that would shape other states' reactions. Other states, in turn, evince military spending behavior shaped by a wide range of forces, among which North Korea's advances are only one factor. One state's leaders may see North Korea's developments as grave but, if already possessing countervailing capabilities, may show little change in military spending behavior. Conversely, another state may be relatively unalarmed, but undertake significant new military programs anyway, either to counter small but important possibilities or to use North Korean activities as a pretext to disguise other motivations. To work around these complexities, I will approach the issue partly as a deductive exercise. First, I will summarize key known parameters of North Korea's program, focusing on those elements most pertinent to the subsequent discussion. Second, I will assess the consequences of North Korea's capabilities for the Northeast Asian region, considering both security implications and broader impacts. This assessment provides a first cut set of expectations for other states' reactions. Third, I will apply this assessment through a general model of acquisition explanations to discern Pyongyang's probable motivations for its activities. This application provides a second cut set of factors influencing other states' reactions. The combination of material consequences and discerned motivations provides a deductive foundation for hypotheses on military spending reactions among other principal Northeast Asian states.2 The essay concludes with an evaluation of some developments in 2009 garnered from the preceding analysis. North Korea's Nuclear Program Evolution of the Nuclear Program Assessing whether North Korea's program has had an appreciable impact on military spending among its key Northeast Asian interlocutors requires more than simply stipulating that North Korea is a nuclear power or now possesses a nuclear deterrent. Rather, the security implications for key affected states are decisively influenced by some precise benchmarks concerning how much fissile material North Korea has acquired and how far its weaponization capabilities have proceeded.3 North Korea is believed to have been accumulating plutonium since 1986, principally using its 5-megawatt electric reactor at the Yongbyon site. The nearby plutonium reprocessing facility is thought to have separated up to ten kilograms of plutonium prior to 1992. In 1994 North Korea discharged the reactor's 8,000 irradiated fuel rods, containing an estimated 27- 29 kilograms of plutonium. …

Since the Agreed Framework (AF) was signed by the United States and North Korea on October 21, 1994, the security situation on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia has changed qualitatively for the worse. The discovery last year of a suspect North Korean nuclear site and the August 31 launch of a Taepo Dong missile have combined to raise fundamental questions about Pyongyang's intentions, its commitment to the agreement, and the possibility of North-South reconciliation. These developments also raise profound questions about the sustainability of current U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula. The Agreed Framework successfully addressed a specific security problem--North Korea's plutonium production at the Yongbyon and Taechon facilities. Under the agreement, operations were frozen at the two facilities and Pyongyang was prevented from obtaining fissile material from the fuel rods of the reactor core for five to six nuclear weapons. Had the program continued unabated, North Korea might have been able to produce enough fissile material for a substantial nuclear arsenal. Arguably, the Agreed Framework was a necessary but not sufficient response to the multiple security challenges posed by North Korea. Indeed, the development of the Taepo Dong missile poses an expanding security threat to Northeast Asia and, increasingly, to the Middle East, Europe, and even the United States itself. Changing Assumptions Experience in dealing with Pyongyang since the Agreed Framework was signed challenges several critical assumptions on which public and Congressional support for U.S. policy has been based. * The first is the assumption made by some senior administration officials that the Agreed Framework had ended North Korea's nuclear program. * The second is that North Korea is a failed state on the verge of collapse and that a landing--collapse perhaps accompanied by aggression--should be avoided. * The third is that the Agreed Framework would induce North Korea to open up to the outside world, initiate a gradual process of North-South reconciliation, and lead to real reform and a soft landing. These assumptions suggested that, even if little progress was made on other political/security issues, the Agreed Framework was an effective, time-buying strategy. At a minimum, North Korea's conventional capabilities would continue to degrade (as they have). Optimally, the North would solve our problems by ultimately reconciling or uniting with the South. These assumptions are now open to question. Reality Check The disclosure of at least one suspect site--on which construction began prior to the agreement--reinforces the possibility that Pyongyang has frozen only a portion of its nuclear program or is seeking to develop a covert nuclear weapons program. The Agreed Framework was structured to become stronger over time in constraining the North's nuclear weapons capability. This meant deferring the requirement for the North Korean nuclear program to come into full compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full-scope safeguards until roughly 2002-03. In effect, the agreement accepted the possibility that North Korea might have one or two nuclear devices. Since 1994, it is also possible that Pyongyang could have acquired additional nuclear weapons technology and/or fissile material from external sources. Moreover, the core assumption of imminent collapse is seriously flawed. Despite severe hardships, there are no signs of regime-threatening social or political unrest, or military disaffection. As underscored in its 50th anniversary celebration last year, the North Korean regime appears to have consolidated itself under Kim Jong Il. There are also no signs that the regime is contemplating any radical market-oriented reforms. Instead, forced by necessity, it is experimenting at the margins with modest reform to alleviate food shortages at the local level and gain hard currency. …

North Korea's alleged admission of a highly enriched uranium program sparked the current nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, leading to resumption of North Korea's nuclear weapons development program. According to U.S. intelligence estimates, North Korea already has four or five nuclear devices. Thus, the North Korean nuclear issue–a serious international issue that is the most important obstacle to the Korean peace process –needs to be resolved as soon as possible peacefully through diplomatic negotiations at the six‐party talks. The Bush administration insisted that the North Korean nuclear crisis be resolved through the six‐party talks, whereas North Korea insisted on bilateral talks with the U.S.The author in this article analyzed the origin and development of the current nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, to evaluate the six‐party talks as an multilateral framework of resolving the nuclear issue from the first round of the six‐party nuclear talks to the third round in detail, and to make policy recommendations for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue at least at the initial phase of North Korean nuclear dismantlement. The six‐party talks process is not yet dead, and will continue.The author maintains that bilateral talks between the U.S. and North Korea are essential to the resolution of North Korea's nuclear standoff peacefully and diplomatically. Both need to engage in direct negotiations without preconditions through the six‐party talks process. Both U.S. and North Korea's hard‐line policies cannot solve the nuclear issue peacefully. Therefore, both sides need to be flexible about their respective positions with political will to compromise. The U.S. should be prepared for specifying its road map for multilateral security assurances for North Korea. The author also argues that the U.S. should reconsider proposing possible economic or energy incentives in exchange for North Korea's nuclear freeze to dismantle its nuclear programs.

Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint StatementThe six-nation to shut down North Korea's nuclear facility was reached on February 13, 2007, largely because President George W. Bush was willing to give U.S. negotiators more flexibility to reach an agreement. Ever since the North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in 2002 after the discovery of a secret nuclear program, the Bush administration has insisted that North Korea should not be rewarded for its bad behavior. Furthermore, many U.S. offers have required North Korea to destroy all its nuclear weapons in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible way before substantial rewards are delivered. Pyongyang has insisted that the United States should provide economic assistance and a security guarantee as preconditions before it gradually dismantles its nuclear weapons (Oh and Hassig, 2004, p. 279).This latest pact accepts North Korea's original position-a freeze of its Yongbyon nuclear facility-and requires the United States to move first by unfreezing North Korean bank accounts at Banco Delta Asia. As shown in Table 1, vexing issues such as the dismantlement of the facility and North Korea's stash of weapons-grade plutonium are subject to further negotiations for the next 60 days.Agreements for the next 60 days, from February 13 to mid-April 2007, included shutting down and sealing the Yongbyon nuclear facility, the provision of 50,000 tons of fuel oil, the provision by North Korea of a list of nuclear programs to be covered by the September 19, 2007, statement, and an agreement to hold North Korea-United States bilateral talks and North Korea-Japan bilateral talks on bilateral issues. Five working groups were to be formed to discuss denuclearization of the Korean peninsula; normalization of North Korea-United States relations; normalization of North Korea-Japan relations; economic and energy cooperation, and a Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism. A sixth round of talks were scheduled for March 19, 2007, at which time the working groups would report on their work and the next steps will be discussed (www.ncno.org, February 15, 2007).Under the agreement, South Korea, Russia, China, and the United States would provide the first part of the aid, 50,000 tons of fuel oil or an equivalent value of economic aid; for the United States, that would require congressional approval, which is likely to be difficult to get. If North Korea disables the reactor and abandons all nuclear programs, it will eventually receive another 950,000 tons of fuel oil or an equivalent value of economic aid. As a result, some conservative politicians have denounced the accord. For example, John R. Bolton, the former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said, It is a bad deal for two reasons. First, it contradicts the fundamental premises of the policy that President Bush has followed since the beginning of his administration. Second, it makes the Bush administration look very weak at a time when U.S. troops are in Iraq and when the United States needs to look strong in dealing with Iran. According to critics, if there were no Banco Delta Asia, which holds $25 million in North Korean accounts, the new agreement would contain exactly the same things that North Korea sought in its negotiations with the United States during the first nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, which resulted in the now-scrapped Agreed Framework (Kessler, 2007).Reasons for the Denuclearization AgreementAccording to U.S. think tanks and policy analysts, the United States has four options in dealing with a nuclear North Korea (Bray, 2003):1. Give economic aid and security assurance if North Korea dismantles its nuclear program.2. Use a military strike against the North Korean nuclear facilities.3. Let North Korea develop nuclear weapons.4. Starve the North Korean regime of money.We will describe some details of these four options below. First, the United States could hand out economic aid and security assurance if North Korea dismantles its nuclear program. …

According to most theories of nuclear proliferation, North Korea did not stand much of a chance of successfully acquiring nuclear weapons. As an economically backward, neopatrimonial regime subject to the threat of preventive strikes and war, North Korea should have failed. Few theories gave it a sporting chance of successfully nuclearizing. Yet here we are, staring down an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-sized barrel of the world’s 10th nuclear weapons power.1 2017 was a banner year for the North Korean nuclear weapons program, as Kim Jong Un sprinted to develop a range of missile capabilities — including a credible ICBM capability — and a thermonuclear weapon. A program that was once derided as a joke, especially after its first purported nuclear test in 2006, is now anything but that. Why did academic theories of nuclear proliferation so seriously underestimate North Korea, and how should we adjust our theories to better account for future nuclear proliferators, so that we do not repeat that mistake?

Contents: Introduction, Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo North Korea's 2nd nuclear crisis and the 6-party talks, Tae-Hwan Kwak The Bush administration and North Korea's nuclear policy, Edward A. Olsen US policy toward North Korea under George W. Bush: a critical appraisal, Curtis H. Martin China and the North Korean crisis: the diplomacy of great power transition, Jeremy Paltiel Japan and the 2nd North Korean nuclear crisis, Yoshinori Kaseda Russia and the North Korean nuclear crisis, Seung-Ho Joo US-North Korean negotiating behavior and the 6-party talks, Scott Snyder Korean peninsula energy development organisation (KEDO): a bridge too far?, C. Kenneth Quinones The 6-party talks and security cooperation in Northeast Asia, Yong-Sup Han Index.

The purposes of this paper are: 1) to examine and analyze how the two presidents' policy goals in dealing with North Korea actually materialized; 2) to illustrate how these two Presidents implement their policy goals toward North Korea; 3) to discuss the Congressional responses to the president's policy goals toward North Korea; and 4) to provide comparative analysis of the two presidents' handling of North Korea. This study shows that different Presidents have dealt with North Korean issues in different ways. Two such presidents, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, tried at the beginning of their terms as president to ignore the brewing problems in North Korea. However, both were forced to solve the North's nuclear issues early on in their respective administrations. Their decisions in dealing with North Korean nuclear capabilities help to define their early reputations as foreign policy makers. Yet, the domestic as well as international contexts that President Clinton and Bush faced were somewhat different. President Clinton maintains that the North's nuclear crisis arose from North Korea's security fears: Abandoned by its two Cold War patrons, economically bankrupt, and internationally isolated, the North Korean government saw the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as the only path to survival and security for their regime. In this regard, Clinton's actual efforts to resolve the issues surrounding the North's nuclear program appeared ambiguous and inconsistent. This led to the temporary suspension of the North's nuclear ambitions through an Agreed Framework. However, President Bush stuck to more of a hardnosed approach. He continues to demand a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of the nuclear program first, before any provision of economic or humanitarian assistance is extended toward North Korea. Bush favors multilateral negotiations, which leads the DPRK to feel more isolated than before. Although the second six‐party talks ended without a major breakthrough, it seems that all parties except the North think the meeting was successful in terms of lowering tensions in Korea. This case study demonstrates several observable features that characterize the president's role in shaping North Korean policy. A president who wants to take a new approach to some element of U.S. policy can be caught between the diplomat's desire for flexibility and the power of domestic political forces. The president can achieve success, but only if the new direction in policy finds acceptance on Capitol Hill.

Despite the volatility and unpredictability North Korea has come to symbolize in international diplomacy and security issues, it represents only half of the potential danger on the Korean peninsula. In a notable departure from its past role as guarantor of stability on the Korean peninsula, the United States has, under the stewardship of the Bush administration, come to be regarded as, at best, an obstacle to peace and security, and at worst a potential trigger for hostility. The most immediate result of this shift on the Korean peninsula has been the US failure to undertake an effective policy formulation process, which has manifested itself (on both sides of the 38th parallel) in more reactive and convulsive responses to challenges from the North Korean regime. Without such understanding there is little hope of advancing discussions or resolving North Korea's nuclear program. Fundamental to understanding North Korea's endgame is realizing that its nuclear weapons program, while menacing, is unlikely to be used offensively without major provocation; it functions as a tool of its diplomacy-missile diplomacy-to ensure survival of the regime. Working closely with South Korea, the United States must ensure that any potential resolution reached on North Korea's nuclear program does not undermine its longer-term objectives for securing broader peace and security on the Korean peninsula. Ideally, any resolution brokered over the North's nuclear weapons program will provide a synergistic effect in addressing the conventional war threat posed by North Korea on the Korean peninsula. In short, the United States must undertake constructive engagement. Steadfast unwillingness to engage with North Korea only provides more fodder for the regime to stall any action, and, as part of its endgame, makes U.S. behavior the issue. the issue, which is part of its endgame.

IntroductionNorth Korean foreign policy has been formulated and implemented with priority given to policy towards the U.S. after the North Korean nuclear crisis of the early 1990s. North Korea assumes that it can survive only under the guarantee of the U.S. for its national security. This attitude was substantially formed after the normalization of South Korean relations with the Soviet Union in 1990 and China in 1992. North Korean relations with China, in particular, were regarded as a blood alliance forged in the Korean War. However, the nature of Sino-North Korean relations changed after the normalization of South Korea-China relations. Moreover, China has begun to value international norms and law as it has grown into a power state in the international community and is apt to treat North Korea as a normal rather than special state. These circumstances forced the North to concentrate its efforts on foreign policy towards the U.S.As for the nuclear program, North Korea believes that nuclear weapons can protect it from external invasion and has therefore developed long-range missiles and nuclear warheads. The North Korean intention to develop nuclear weapons runs against the American foreign policy of emphasizing the nonproliferation of nuclear warheads. The conflict between North Korea and the U.S. on the nuclear program led North Korea to formulate and implement its nuclear policy with prudence and the involvement of many government departments.Most studies on North Korean foreign policy have focused on the influence of the top leader's perception and rational action. This paper conducts research from a different perspective by examining the North's foreign policy in terms of the bureaucratic politics model. Analysts argue that North Korean foreign policies have mostly been made by the top decision-maker. In contrast to such previous studies, this article focuses on the decision-making process under the top leader and argues that the pulling and hauling among North Korean bureaucrats to establish foreign policies has significantly affected North Korean foreign policies. Different policy preferences have been identified by U.S. negotiators who participated in the North Korea-U.S. talks held in 1993 and 1994 and by analysts who interviewed North Korean officials. This research is conducted by analyzing those policy preferences and the process of reaching compromise between bureaucratic groups in North Korea.Making Foreign Policy in North Korea and Bureaucratic Politics ModelUntil the demise of the Cold War, analysts who specialized in North Korean foreign policy mostly inquired into the role of the top leader and the Juche (self-reliance) ideology. Since then, such studies have mainly covered its historical changes and its characteristics in the era of Kim Jong-il. Some studies expanded their scope to examine the structure and process of North Korean foreign policy on the basis of theoretical frameworks.1 Theory-based studies must be increased as they provide us with a deeper understanding and thus improve predictability of North Korean foreign policy. Nevertheless, it is hard to find research cases conducted on the basis of theoretical frameworks such as the cognitive model, the rational actor approach and the bureaucratic politics model, which are key approaches in foreign policy analysis. In particular, the bureaucratic politics model was not used to examine North Korean foreign policy for two reasons. First, analysts have doubted that the bureaucratic politics model can be applied to North Korea's socialistic and authoritarian system. Second, research concerning the bureaucratic politics model needs in-depth examination and analysis of the process of making foreign policy. The difficulty in gathering materials concerning North Korean foreign policy-making has been an obstacle to studies in this direction.Every political system has a hierarchical order comprising top leaders, middlelevel leaders and numerous bureaucrats. …