Abstract
A problem to solve in generative grammar is to account for why children are able to note when a sentence or expression is ambiguous, even if they have not received explicit training for that. The theory of mental models can give an explanation in that way. That explanation is based upon the idea that people interpret linguistic messages by considering the semantics models corresponding to them, and it has been also proposed that the syntactic structures of those messages can be recovered by taken those very models into account. However, the point of this paper is that it tries to show that ambiguity at semantic level, that is, the cases in which models referring to different facts can be attributed to one sentence, does not necessarily lead to ambiguity at syntactic level. As it is argued, it is possible to capture models describing several opposite circumstances by means of only one logical form.
Highlights
It has been raised that generative grammar has several problems to remove (HORNSTEIN, 1987) and proposed that the theory of mental models (e.g., QUELHAS, RASGA, & JOHNSONLAIRD, 2019) can do that (LÓPEZ-ASTORGA, 2019a)
The explanations of the theory of mental models for those problems in general and the problem of ambiguity in particular are based upon a very important thesis of that theory: people process language by analyzing the semantic models or possibilities that can correspond to utterances
If a sentence is ambiguous, it has to be possible to express that ambiguity by means of its logical form, without the need to assume the possibility of that sentence having two or more different syntactic structures
Summary
It has been raised that generative grammar has several problems to remove (HORNSTEIN, 1987) and proposed that the theory of mental models (e.g., QUELHAS, RASGA, & JOHNSONLAIRD, 2019) can do that (LÓPEZ-ASTORGA, 2019a). The explanations of the theory of mental models for those problems in general and the problem of ambiguity in particular are based upon a very important thesis of that theory: people process language by analyzing the semantic models or possibilities that can correspond to utterances (see e.g., KHEMLANI & JOHNSON-LAIRD, 2019). Another interesting point in this way is that it has been claimed as well that, from those models, it is possible to identify the real formal or logical structures of sentences or expressions (e.g. LÓPEZ-ASTORGA, 2019b). The reasons why the ambiguity in sentences in natural language does not have an influence on their real logical forms, as well as the mode just one logical form can capture the same degree of ambiguity as its sentence in natural language, will be indicated
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