Logical Forms Depend on Semantic Models: the Illusory Disjunctive Sentences as Pieces of Evidence

Miguel López-Astorga

doi:10.18309/anp.v1i51.1340

Abstract

A teoria dos modelos mentais é capaz de explicar um amplo espectro de fatos relacionados à cognição. No entanto, pode-se pensar que o problema com essa teoria do ponto de vista linguístico é que ela ignora a forma lógica e, portanto, a sintaxe. Foi proposto que existem maneiras de vincular a teoria dos modelos mentais a estruturas formais. Contudo, permanece um problema em propostas desse tipo: a detecção de formas lógicas sempre parece depender de possibilidades icônicas como as suscitadas pela teoria mencionada, o que, por sua vez, parece significar que esse último arcabouço se refere a aspectos realmente básicos da cognição e da linguagem. Este artigo tenta mostrar que tudo isso está correto recorrendo a um exemplo que parece não ter sido estudado em profundidade a partir dessa perspectiva: o caso das sentenças ilusórias disjuntivas, ou seja, sentenças disjuntivas que as pessoas tendem a considerar verdadeiras e que na verdade não são.

Highlights

The theory of mental models is a contemporary theory about reasoning and language
But perhaps, as far as the aims of this paper are concerned, it can be said that it proposes that logic is not a basic element in the human mind, that syntax is a secondary aspect in the intellectual activity, that semantics and pragmatics are more essential in that very activity, and that reasoning and language are led by models describing reality in an iconic way (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2012; Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 2012; Quelhas, Rasga, & Johnson-Laird, 2019)
It gives accounts of many controversial results reported in the specialized literature, including those referring to the way people apply inference rules such as Modus Tollendo Tollens (e.g., Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2009), to how individuals often understand certain paradoxical inferences (e.g., Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 2012), to the case of certain illusory disjunctive sentences (e.g., Quelhas et al, 2019), or to the manner the human mind tends to consider probabilities (e.g., Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, & Goodwin, 2015)

Summary

Introduction

The theory of mental models is a contemporary theory about reasoning and language. Its claims are several, but perhaps, as far as the aims of this paper are concerned, it can be said that it proposes that logic is not a basic element in the human mind, that syntax is a secondary aspect in the intellectual activity, that semantics and pragmatics are more essential in that very activity, and that reasoning and language are led by models describing reality in an iconic way (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2012; Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 2012; Quelhas, Rasga, & Johnson-Laird, 2019). This is so because, as pointed out, the main idea of the theory seems to be that human reasoning has nothing to do with formal structures, and that it is mainly related to iconic models or possibilities (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2012; López-Astorga, 2019).

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