Scaling Up Political Ecology: The Case of Illegal Pesticides on Fresh Vegetables Imported into the United States, 1996–2006

Abstract

Compliance with regulations on pesticide residues in food is a major health and safety issue, as well as a signal about the complex set of ecological, social, and regulatory relationships. This article presents a multiscale analysis of data from analytical chemistry tests of pesticide residues conducted by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration on fresh vegetables from 1996 to 2006. Empirical findings include: (1) domestic vegetables have lower adverse (illegal) residue rates than imported produce; (2) adverse rates vary greatly by country of export and do not correspond to a nation's relative wealth or region; (3) intensity of testing (tests per kilogram of vegetables imported) varies considerably by country; (4) vegetables with high adverse rates are generally minor crops or vegetables with above-ground edible portions, and (5) fourteen pesticides out of 476 account for two thirds of all violations. Based on this analysis, and primary and secondary data on farmers' pesticide use, I develop a political ecological framework to explain high violation rates and to create hypotheses about countries with high violation rates: Guatemala, Spain, Jamaica, and China. I propose two hypotheses for high levels of violative residues. First, farmers face a cost and price squeeze and, where there is little exporter control, respond by using more effective and more highly residual pesticides like the organophosphates. Second, in other commodity chains, continued residue problems in the U.S. market are a by-product of production aimed at compliance with other regions' regulations.