Risk assessment in distribution networks considering cyber coupling

Abstract

With the continuous development of information and communication technologies and their wide application in distribution networks, which have evolved into cyber-physical distribution systems (CPDS). Yet, interactions between cyber and physical systems mean power systems face a greater potential risk. Since feeder automation (FA) systems in a CPDS can quickly isolate faults and restore services, to reduce customer outage times, the potential effect of cyberattacks on FA systems is massive. This paper proposes a risk assessment method for cyberattacks in distribution networks considering cyber coupling. The proposed method takes into account the impacts of cyber systems on power systems, and vice versa. Regarding the cyberattack, an attack method to mislead the judgment of FA systems by tampering with monitoring data of remote terminal units (RTUs) is analyzed, and a Bayesian attack graph (BAG) model is adopted to quantify the successful probability of RTUs. To calculate the attack consequences, a power supply restoration model considering the interdependence of cyber and physical systems is developed, which is measured in scale and in duration to full restoration. The proposed methodology is tested and validated using the modified IEEE 33-node and CPS 62-node test systems. This study highlights the importance of assessing distribution network security from the cyber-physical point of view.