Abstract
Margaret Gilbert, the grand old lady of social ontology, has turned to rights theory in this impressive book.1 However, the back-cover blurb of the book is bound to cause bafflement among those familiar with the literature covering rights. The book claims to be the ‘first extended treatment of demand-rights’. A demand-right is then identified as ‘the standing or authority to demand a particular action from another person’. In the Preface, Gilbert further states that this class of rights ‘has not received extended attention from rights theorists. In some cases, it is barely noticed’ (vi). Though Gilbert’s treatment is in many ways novel, the just-mentioned claim is surprising: demand-rights sound very similar to how rights are understood in the so-called will theories of rights. At times, Gilbert explicitly recognizes the affinities of will-theory rights and demand-rights (e.g. at 244, where she takes H.L.A. Hart’s early conception of a right to be ‘extremely close, if not identical, to that of a demand-right’). Will theories have certainly been subject to numerous treatments, some of which can justifiably be described as ‘extensive’. How demand-rights relate to will-theory rights is one issue I will return to below.
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