Revisiting nuclear hedging: ballistic missiles and the Iranian example

Abstract

Abstract Technological shifts have made nascent nuclear arsenals more vulnerable. This article examines how this affects nuclear hedgers—that is, states deliberately seeking nuclear latency or the capability to develop the bomb. It argues that growing vulnerabilities provide hedgers with increasing incentives to acquire sophisticated ballistic missiles. Possession of missiles is crucial to limit the ‘window of vulnerability’ between a nuclear breakout decision and the attainment of a nuclear arsenal with deterrence value. The article illustrates this tendency through a case-study of the Iranian missile and rocket programs. It finds that missile acquisition has indeed been an integral part of Iran's hedging strategy, and that several of the systems it has acquired indicate an interest in nuclear weapons delivery. Furthermore, Iran's sophisticated missile arsenal significantly shortens its path to a credible nuclear deterrent. The article contributes to the proliferation literature, which has overlooked that the development of missiles is an increasingly important element of contemporary nuclear hedging. Its findings show that missiles increasingly need to be considered in scholarly assessments of states' nuclear latency and hedging, and in discussions about how difficult it is to acquire nuclear weapons. Moreover, the findings indicate that practitioners working to prevent proliferation should prioritize tracking missile programs.