"Religion as an Engine of Civil Policy": A Comment on the First Amendment Limitations on the Church-State Partnership in the Social Welfare Field

Abstract

James Madison warned in his famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments that to use tax revenues to finance teachers of the Christian Religion is to Religion as an engine of Civil policy.' Such a tax assessment would of course violate the Establishment Clause of the first amendment.2 Congress cannot prescribe religious education for the ills of society. But the federal and state governments can employ religiously motivated persons and institutions to carry out governmental functions. As Chief Justice Warren stated in McGowan v. Maryland,3 government action is not banned under the first amendment merely because it happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.4 The many Church-State partnerships in the social service field are based upon this fortunate harmonization of governmental and religious purposes. Chief Justice Warren's statement answers one question yet creates another, perhaps more important, one. Governmental and religious purposes may validly coincide, but at what point does this harmonization of purpose become subsidization of religious activity in effect? Supreme Court cases since McGowan give answers to this question. In three sections, this paper will analyze the first amendment limitations on the Church-State partnership in the social services field. In the first section, the past and present role of the Church5 as a social service provider will be summarized. In the second section, the Religion Clauses will be analyzed to determine what constitutional restrictions are imposed upon the Church and State when they deal with