Realism, Miracles, and the Common Cause

Abstract

Scientific realism is the doctrine that our theories are intended to literal descriptions of the world. It is the claim that there is a realm of non-observable entities and processes, and that science legitimately appeals to this realm in its explanations of the observable world. This is a sketchy characterization, and with it go some sketchy arguments. These are the miracle arguments for scientific realism. Here is the way J.J.C. Smart puts his version:If the phenomenalist about theoretical entities is correct we must believe in a cosmic coincidence. That is, if this is so, statements about electrons, etc., are of only instrumental value: they simply enable us to predict phenomena on the level of galvanometers and cloud chambers. They do nothing to remove the surprising character of these phenomena....[But is] it not odd that the phenomena of the world should be such as to make a purely instrumental theory true?