Key Arguments for Scientific Realism

Abstract

In this chapter, I present in canonical (or standard) form and then evaluate key arguments for scientific realism (or against antirealism about science). The first argument is the most influential Positive Argument for scientific realism, most commonly known as the “no miracles” argument, which purports to show that scientific realism is the best explanation for the empirical success of science. The second argument, which can be found in Grover Maxwell’s seminal (1962) paper, purports to show that there is no principled distinction between observables and unobservables, and thus, if our belief in the existence of the former is justified, which it is, then our belief in the existence of the latter is justified as well. The third argument can also be found in Maxwell’s seminal (1962) paper and it purports to show that belief in the existence of the theoretical entities of our best scientific theories, even if they are unobservable, is justified because any theoretical entity can become observable in principle. The fourth argument builds on Ian Hacking’s (Representing and intervening: introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1983, p. 23) famous slogan for Entity Realism, “if you can spray them, they are real,” and proceeds from corroborating the existence of theoretical entities through results obtained by distinct experimental means. The fifth argument is based on Ludwig Fahrbach’s (Synthese 180(2):139–155, 2011) observation that science is growing at an exponential rate. When weighted exponentially, the best scientific theories since the 1950s appear to have been stable, which in turn inspires an optimistic induction to the conclusion that our best scientific theories will remain stable.