Key Positions in the Contemporary Scientific Realism/Antirealism Debate

Abstract

In this chapter, I survey key positions in the scientific realism/antirealism debate in contemporary philosophy of science. The first is a selective realist position, which is known as Explanationist Realism, according to which we should believe only in the indispensable parts of our best scientific theories. Those parts that are considered indispensable, the so-called “working posits” (Kitcher, The advancement of science: Science without legend, objectivity without illusions. Oxford University Press, New York, 1993), are the ones that are responsible for, or best explain, the predictive success of our best scientific theories (Psillos, Scientific realism: how science tracks truth. Routledge, London, 1999). The second is an antirealist position with a long history in philosophy of science (see, for example, Duhem, The aim and structure of physical theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Translated from the French by Philip P. Wiener, 1954/1982), known as Instrumentalism, according to which scientific theories are mere instruments or tools of prediction (Rowbottom, The instrument of science: scientific anti-realism revitalised. Routledge, London, 2019). The third is an influential antirealist position, which is known as Constructive Empiricism and is due to Bas van Fraassen (The scientific image. Oxford University Press, New York, 1980), according to which science aims at empirical adequacy, not truth or approximate truth. The fourth is another influential realist position, which is known as Entity Realism and is due to Ian Hacking (Representing and intervening: introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1983), according to which one is justified in taking a realist stance with respect to entities that can be manipulated and that facilitate interventions in nature (Sankey, Howard, Scientific realism and the rationality of science. Ashgate, Hampshire, 2008). The fifth is another selective realist position, which is known as Structural Realism, according to which we should be realists, not about theoretical entities or processes, but rather about structures (Worrall, Dialectica 43(1–2):99–124, 1989; Ladyman, Stud. Hist. Philos. Sci. A 29(3):409–424, 1998; French, The structure of the world: metaphysics and representation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014).