Key Arguments Against Scientific Realism

Abstract

In this chapter, I present in canonical (or standard) form and then evaluate key arguments against scientific realism (or for antirealism about science). The first argument is known as the “pessimistic induction” or the “pessimistic meta-induction.” In its original formulation, attributed to Larry Laudan (Philos Sci 48(1):19–49, 1981), the argument is based on a list of theories that are supposed to be counterexamples to the realist thesis that empirical success is a mark of (approximate) truth. Other formulations of the argument have it as an inductive argument from a sample of theories that were discarded in the past to the conclusion that our present scientific theories will probably be discarded as well. The second argument is a positive argument for Bas van Fraassen’s (The scientific image. Oxford University Press, New York, 1980) antirealist position, namely, Constructive Empiricism. The third argument proceeds from the observation that scientists cannot claim to be in a privileged epistemic position. According to this argument, it is unlikely that our best scientific theories are (approximately) true because scientists are not especially skilled at developing theories that are likely true or approximately true. A contemporary proponent of this argument for antirealism is Brad Wray (Int Stud Philos Sci 22(3):317–326, 2008). The fourth is an argument for antirealism from what Kyle Stanford (Exceeding our grasp: science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Oxford University Press, New York, 2006) calls the “Problem of Unconceived Alternatives” (PUA). According to Stanford, the historical record of science reveals that past scientists typically failed to conceive of alternatives to their favorite, then-successful theories. This is supposed to make it more likely that present scientists fail to conceive of alternatives to their favorite, now-successful theories. For these reasons, Stanford argues, we should not believe our present scientific theories are (approximately) true. The fifth argument purports to show that many of the scientific theories we currently accept will be discarded sometime in the future, as the “pessimistic induction” does, but it proceeds from the premise that the research goals and interests of scientists change over time (Wray, Brad K., Resisting scientific realism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018).