Abstract
“Maximizing expected utility (MEU)” is one assumption of (strict) Bayesian decision theory [Savage 1972]. According to the principle of MEU, in a given decision situation, the decision maker should choose one of the alternatives with maximal expected utility [For an excellent discussion of decision theory, see Jeffrey 1990]. However, MEU as the foundation of Bayesian decision theory has been under attack. One counterexample that seems to dispute MEU as a rationality principle is offered by Daniel Ellsberg[Ellsberg 1961]. While discussing what has been dubbed as the Ellsberg paradox, I will consider briefly three decision principles, each of which is different from the MEU principle.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
