Realism about What? Unobservable Entities and the Metaphysics of Modality

Bruno Borge

doi:10.4013/fsu.2016.171.09

Abstract

Most philosophers who advocate Scientific Realism (SR) endorse also Modal Realism (MR), i.e., assume commitments with objective modality. However, the precise relationship between these positions has been scarcely explored. In this paper I argue that there is an indirect implication from SR to MR. Although the basic thesis of SR does not imply MR, both the main argument for SR and the best realist theory of reference do imply modal commitments. Keywords: Scientific Realism, Modal Realism, Modality, No-Miracle Argument, Causal Descriptivism.

Highlights

Scientific Realism (SR) and Modal Realism (MR) are both conceptua ly and historica ly related
A non-conclusive but sti l important point to be made is about what could be ca led a realist attitude towards modality, which is typical among SRists
It is not hard to show how what I ca led a realist attitude toward scientific theories makes it very likely that if you are a SRist, you have a commitment to MR

Summary

Introduction

Scientific Realism (SR) and Modal Realism (MR) are both conceptua ly and historica ly related. There is a realist attitude towards scientific theories that makes SRists more likely to accept modal commitments. SR states, mainly, that the unobserva le entities posited by our best scientific theories exist This ontological claim has epistemic and semantic counterparts, i.e., the claims that we have knowledge about those entities and that our statements about them have truth values—as opposed to instrumentalism. It’s enough for the aims of this paper to define MR as the position which accepts that there is an objective counterpart that underpins the truth values of modal statements which are not logical truths—mainly of those that assign necessity/possibility to natural re ularities or phenomena. The last section includes the conclusions and final comments to this work

Explanation and the

Conclusion