Modal Realism with Overlap

Abstract

Abstract In this paper, I formulate, elucidate, and defend a version of modal realism with overlap, the view that objects are literally present at more than one possible world. The version that I defend has several interesting features: (i) it is committed to an ontological distinction between regions of space time and material objects; (ii) it is committed to compositional pluralism, which is the doctrine that there is more than one fundamental part-whole relation; and (iii) it is the modal analogue of endurantism, which is the doctrine that objects persist through time by being wholly present at each moment they are located. Despite David Lewis’s impressive arguments for modal realism, it is safe to say that it has won few adherents. Moreover, modal realism with overlap (henceforth: ‘MRO’)-the view that objects are literally present at more than one world-is probably the least popular position to occupy in modal metaphysics. Consequently, the possibility that a version of modal realism with overlap might be a serious contender has been virtually ignored. However, we ought to examine MRO more carefully for the following reasons. First, one reason for rejecting modal realism is that it allegedly implies a counterpart-theoretic account of de remodality, according to which claims about the properties that an object could have had are made true by the existence of a counterpart of that object which has those properties. But modal realism per seis not committed to counterpart theory. One realist alternative to counterpart theory is modal realism with overlap.