Razones en lo jurídico y en lo moral, dos razones, diferentes racionalidades

Abstract

The article takes as its thematic object legal reasoning. It proposes that the distinction between theoretical reason and practical reason is the key to better understand the nature of legal reasoning. The thesis is argued from the distinction between theoretical reason and practical reason. On the one hand, theoretical reasoning is directly related to gaining knowledge about the world. On the other hand, practical reasoning is concerned about deciding the best course of action in a particular situation. Although related, the two rationales are governed by different evaluation criteria. The article also analyzes moral practical reasoning as a reasoning that belongs exclusively to the domain of practical reason. It’s structure and evaluation criteria are discussed. Finally, the paper distinguishes moral from legal reasoning in that the legal reasoning has requirements of the theoretical reason (knowledge of facts and knowledge of rules) and from the practical reason (deciding what to do in a particular case). Such requirements reveal that some notions of rationality are applicable to legal reasoning but not to its moral counterpart.