Ranking the Graduate Departments in the 1980s: Toward Objective Qualitative Indicators

Abstract

This essay is based on several technical works, including Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985) and Brams and Marek P. Hessel, Threat Power in Sequential International Studies Quarterly 28, no. 1 (March 1984): 15-36, and a number of coauthored papers by Brams and Kilgour: Optimal Deterrence, Social Philosophy & Policy 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1985): 118-135, reprinted in Nuclear Rights/Nuclear Wrongs, ed. Ellen Frankel Paul et al. (London: Basil Blackwell, 1 986), pp. 1 18-135; The Path to Stable Deterrence, in Dynamic Models of International Conflict, ed. Urs Luterbacher and Michael D. Ward (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1985), pp. 11-25; Rational Deescalation, in Evolution, Games, and Learning: Models for Adaptation in Machines and Nature, Physica 16D, ed. Burton Wendroff (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1986); Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis, in Modeling and Analysis of Arms-Control Problems, ed. Rudolf Avenhaus and Reiner K. Huber (Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, forthcoming 1986); Verification and Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis; Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs: A GameTheoretic Analysis of Star Wars. Also relevant is a paper coauthored by Brams, Kilgour, Rudolf Avenhaus, and John Fichtner, The Probability of Nuclear War. Extensive citations to the literature on nuclear conflict are included in these sources.