Quality-of-service closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation: A hierarchy game approach

Abstract

To realize optimal day-ahead operation of battery swapping and charging systems (BSCSs), a closed loop supply chain (CLSC) based management scheme is proposed, where the game theory is adopted for benefits allocation. The CLSC is used to depict the battery-swapping-charging process between the battery charging stations (BCSs) and battery swapping stations (BSSs). The arrival, departure and swapping service of electric vehicles (EVs) at BSSs is modeled as distinct queues based on the network calculus theory. The depleted batteries (DBs) and well-charging batteries (WBs) based interaction among BCSs and BSSs is formulated as a Stackelberg game. In the game, one BCS acts as the leader and the BSSs act as the followers. The BCS sets optimized prices to maximize its utility and the BSSs optimally demand WBs, supply DBs and provide battery swapping services to maximize their own utilities while guaranteeing the quality of service (QoS) needed for battery swapping. The existence of Stackelberg equilibriums (SEs) of the proposed game is proved. A differential evaluation based hybrid algorithm is proposed to compute an SE. The effectiveness of proposed method has been demonstrated by the simulation results, guaranteeing the QoS and balancing benefits among the BCS and BSSs while maximizing social welfare.