Abstract
This article characterises how the Pyrrhonian Sceptic uses language to test if such use is susceptible to Dogmatic criticisms, especially from a Stoic perspective. It will examine two characterisations of that use. The first one, reported by Diogenes Laertius in his Lives of Eminent Philosophers 9.71-78, will be discussed as a logical use of human language broader than a philosophical one. The second characterisation depends on the discourse chosen by Timon of Phlius in his Silloi. In this work, the Epic catalogue shows itself as a powerful mechanism; it allows to report, to make history about philosophy itself and to offer an account of Pyrrho’s place in it without postulating substantive theses. This literary use and the previous philosophical one constitute the particular uses of Pyrrhonian language.
Highlights
RESUMEN: Este artículo caracteriza el uso del lenguaje del escéptico pirrónico con el ánimo de examinar si tal uso es susceptible de las críticas dogmáticas, especialmente de las estoicas
The aphasia challenge is a warhorse deployed against the Sceptics by the Dogmatists, especially by the Stoics
As Corti notes, there are 310 few studies on the peculiarities of Diogenes Laertius’ presentation on the status of Sceptical discourse; most studies involve the corresponding passages in Sextus Empiricus (P. 1.187-208), which offer much more detail
Summary
Diogenes Laertius’ passage is devoted to the Sceptical use of discourse, and it closely resembles Sextus’ characterisation. Dogmatics believe that the Sceptical practice 315 of comparing one discourse to another or one reasoning to another is assertoric, even if it is circumscribed to their mental states Corti justifies the use of these verbs by insisting on the distinction between non-evident external objects and the individual’s feelings or psychological states He clarifies that for talking about external objects; it is necessary to have concepts and beliefs about them, i.e. a robust cognitive apparatus committed to truth. Pyrrhonian language must be able to fulfil both tasks: on the one hand, it must dismantle the ambitions of reason and, on the other, it must promote Sceptical choice Corti adequately explains this first task in his reconstruction of Sextus’ passages (2009) and Diogenes Laertius’ (2015). Except for the Academics – who are precisely the primary source of modern and contemporary scepticism –, all ancient Sceptics
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