Promoting the Development of China’s New-Energy Vehicle Industry in the Post-Subsidy Era: A Study Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory Method

Abstract

Government policy constraints and the green credit support of banks have played an indispensable role in promoting the development of the new energy vehicle (NEV) industry. To study the relationship between the government, the banks, and automobile manufacturers in the post-subsidy era and to promote the development of the NEV industry in China, we constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model for the government, the banks, and automobile manufacturers during the subsidy decline, analyzed the evolutionary process of the system, and used MATLAB to simulate the evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) and the sensitivity of related parameters. The results demonstrate the following: (1) There are five possible evolutionary equilibrium points in the early, middle, and late stages of the NEV industry; (2) with the increase in the phase-out rates and the transaction prices of NEV points, the government is more inclined to low subsidies, the banks are more inclined to implement green credit, and enterprises are more inclined to produce NEVs; (3) there is a threshold for the impact of government incentives on the evolutionary results of the government and the banks, beyond which the evolutionary process of the government and the banks will be unstable; (4) with the increase in financing costs saved by green credit, the government is more inclined to low subsidies and enterprises are more inclined to produce NEVs, while changes in financing costs have less impact on the strategies of banks. According to these findings, the government, the banks, and automobile manufacturers can be relied upon to promote the development of the NEV industry in China.