Abstract

Abstract : The Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the controls governing the conduct of all U.S. military operations in Southeast Asia (SEA). On the grand scale they, represent the operational interpretations of U.S. policies and goals with respect to the limited SEA conflict. On the operating level, they are a detailed set of rules to be followed closely by all commanders, air planners, control personnel, and combat crewmembers in the actual planning and flying of combat missions. At the time of this writing the ROE were in the limelight in the United States because of possible deviations authorized by the military command in SEA. In April 1972, the Seventh Air Force (7AF) Commander, General John D. Levelle, was removed from command amid allegations that he personally had permitted air strikes not authorized under the ROE in North Vietnam (NVN) from November 1971 through March 1972. Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on these charges were continuing into the fall of 1972. This report presents the ROE for air operations in SEA from November 1969 through September 1972. It is the third in a series of CHECO reports on ROE. The first report traced the evolution of the air ROE from 1960 through 1965. The second report discussed the changes in the ROE for SEA from 1 January 1966 through 1 November 1969. All ROE are essentially restrictive in nature and, as such, they increase the difficulty of conducting an overall air war. The purpose of this report, however, is not to analyze the impact of the ROE on the ability and success of commanders in conducting military operations. Rather, this report presents the significant events and changes pertaining to the ROE since the last report and, whenever possible, relates them to the political or military conditions which produced the requirements for the changes.

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