Abstract
Abstract : During the period 1966-1969, there were three categories of rules which controlled the employment of airpower in the Southeast Asia (SEA) conflict . The Rules of Engagement (ROE) were promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and sent through channels to the operational commands. Covering all of SEA, these Rules of Engagement defined: geographical limits of SEA, territorial airspace, territorial seas, and international seas and airspace; definitions of friendly forces, hostile forces, hostile acts, hostile aircraft, immediate pursuit, and hostile vessels; rules governing what could be attacked by U.S . aircraft, under what conditions immediate pursuit could be conducted, how declarations of a hostile should be handled, and the conditions of self-defense. The second set of rules was designated Operating Restrictions, which were contained in the CINCPAC Basic Operations Orders. These rules included prohibitions against striking locks, dams, hydropower plants, fishing boats, houseboats, and naval craft in certain areas; prohibitions against strikes in certain defined areas such as the Chinese Communist (ChiCom) buffer zone or the Hanoi/Haiphong restricted areas; conditions under which targets might be struck, such as validation requirements, when FACs were required, distances from motorable roads; and conditions under which napalm could be used, when CS was authorized, when ground fire could be returned. Although, in theory, these three types of rules were distinct, in practice, they were almost always referred to collectively as Rules of Engagement. This report retains this policy, since the formal distinctions were not always honored in message traffic and further, a report unifying the three types of limitations presents a compact picture of the restraints upon airpower that were in existence.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have