Preempting Proliferation of WMD: Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and its Challenges

Abstract

Abstract While much attention has been focused on the U.S. war in Iraq, with debate over the preemptive nature of U.S. military action, the Bush administration has launched another important policy initiative in its fight against a new threat posed by the September 11 terrorist attack, which could challenge traditional concepts of international law and the idea of sovereign rights in world politics. Launched in May 2003 by President Bush, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) represents a mounting U.S. resolve for curbing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). As the war in Iraq demonstrated the Bush administration's resolve to take outright military action against a possible threat posed by a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, PSI represents parallel new thinking and activism. PSI reflects a shift from a traditional concept of export controls, focusing on prevention, to a more aggressive approach of preempting proliferation of WMD at short notice. Despite their effort to create a broad international consensus, the United States and its allies may face serious legal as well as practical challenges in interdiction of vessels suspected of carrying WMD and their delivery systems. PSI is here to stay as long as the U.S. war against terrorists and rogue states, and their wish to acquire WMD continues. And increasing numbers of countries will be asked to cooperate with the PSI activities. Some, such as South Korea, could face a serious dilemma as the U.S. pressure for cooperation mounts against their wishes