Polling on Watergate: The Battle for Public Opinion

Abstract

How do polls become part of the process through which decisions are made and issues resolved? Case studies of the development and outcome of controversies, like Watergate, can go a long way toward clarification of the direct and indirect impacts of the polls. Gladys Engel Lang is Professor of Sociology and Communications at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. Kurt Lang is Professor of Sociology at the same university. This paper is based on research by the authors as Fellows at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. This support is gratefully acknowledged, as well as a small grant from the John and Mary R. Markle Foundation. Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 44:530-547 ? 1980 by The Trustees of Columbia University Published by Elsevier North-Holland, Inc. 0033-362X/80/0044-530/$1.75 This content downloaded from 157.55.39.129 on Thu, 28 Jul 2016 04:19:37 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms POLLING ON WATERGATE 531 come; even this minority, while a bit disillusioned, nevertheless accepted the necessity of Nixon's leaving. Few were bitter or vengeful. Seldom, indeed, had there been a greater display of national unity, except in a national emergency, than when Nixon finally stepped down. Whatever division there had been, the public, for the most part, agreed that Nixon was guilty of obstruction of justice, of abuse of power, of deceiving and lying to the nation, and of abusing their trust.2 Nor did Ford's succession to the presidency stir the controversy it might have. Not that people were as unanimous or enthusiastic about his accession to power as the media were reporting. Ford's approval rating in the polls just after he took office-71 percent, according to Gallup-was below that of Johnson (79 percent) and Truman (87 percent) when similarly elevated from the vice presidency. The legitimacy of this changeover was open to question on several grounds. Ford was only the first unelected chief executive but also Nixon's hand-picked successor (albeit confirmed by Congress) and one of his staunchest defenders during Watergate almost to the bitter end. The Nixon presidency nevertheless ended not with a bang but a whimper, without any serious clashes or much visible dissent, without much joyful demonstration or dancing in the streets. The public response was strangely muted. Long months of apparent polarization had suddenly ended with minimal mass display of affect. The transition would have taken place so quietly had it been preceded by a dramatic reversal of public opinion. Who would have dared suggest at the beginning of the second Nixon administration that a president reelected with a lopsided majority and at the peak of his popularity could be forced out of office 18 months later? Or that the highest secular office in the world would be turned over, with the nation's blessing, to a man with only limited national recognition? Richard Nixon himself believed that public opinion was the critical factor in what he called the overriding of [his] landslide mandate (Nixon, 1978:905f). His struggle to stay in office, especially after the firing of Archibald Cox in October 1973, when impeachment became a real possibility, was for him a race for public support, what he called his last campaign, only this time it was for office but for his political life (Nixon, 1978:972). 2 Our survey on Long Island showed roughly three-fourths of those interviewed judged the president guilty of obstruction of justice and abuse of power, charges on which he would have been tried by the Senate. About two-thirds judged him guilty of income tax fraud and misuse of the taxpayers' money for private purposes, charges on which the House Judiciary Committee had failed to vote articles of impeachment. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.129 on Thu, 28 Jul 2016 04:19:37 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms