Abstract

This chapter analyses politics in Northern Ireland in the context, first, of the failed attempts to implement devolution that led to its suspension, then the St Andrews Agreement in 2006, elections and the restoration of devolution in 2007. It reappraises the tortuous years in terms of the territorial strains that were still present in Northern Ireland, the resources available to the Republican/Nationalist and Unionist party leaderships in Northern Ireland as well as to the Blair government, and the political management approaches that they each pursued. It focuses on the political imperatives and constraints that determined the Northern Ireland Assembly's journey between intermittent existence and suspension, and eventually led to the unlikely agreement between the leaders of the extreme representatives of Republicanism and Unionism. The chapter is informed by the proposition that both sides in Northern Ireland still recognised their resource limitations in asserting their ideal outcomes in the short term. The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Fein still pursued power-sharing devolution in the short to medium term to realise their long-term objectives of Irish unity. This was principally to be achieved through electoral success and the cultivation of the North–South institutions under strand two of the Belfast Agreement to normalise Irish governance through instrumental arguments, shared policy development and functional spillovers. Meanwhile, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), as the principal Unionist party, competitively sought to use devolution as a new framework in which to sustain an inter-governmentalist approach to governing within the UK, asserting the very different long-term aim of maintaining Northern Ireland within the Union.

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