Political opposition and voter mobilization in an authoritarian state: The case of parliamentary elections in Iran

Abstract

ABSTRACT Most autocratic leaders have confidence they can control election results by holding unfair and unfree competitive elections. They have many tools at their disposal to ensure they do not lose elections. Although electoral fraud and ballot box stuffing can secure an easy win, such tools may trigger mass protests and jeopardize the existence of the nondemocratic state. Nondemocratic leaders abuse the electoral system to prevent coordination among opponents and the masses. From changing election rules and banning political parties to eliminating effective candidates, the ‘menu of manipulation’ that nondemocratic leaders employ blocks creation of a focal point for collective action among the opposition. Moreover, the opposition rarely has an opportunity to solve collective action problems and deliver a unified message for change. When the opposition does capitalize on this opportunity, a segment of the electorate that opposes the nondemocratic leader responds to the opposition’s mobilization efforts. Based on original data gathered at the district level between 2000 and 2016, this study offers an original investigation into Iranian legislative elections. I argue that when opponents of an autocratic leader provide a unified request for change in the status quo, there is a surge in voter turnout.