Abstract
Although concepts are typically assumed to be at the core of both the language of politics and the language of political inquiry, the meaning of “concept” has remained notoriously vague. In everyday usage, prominent elements of philosophy, and the literature of political science and political theory, concepts are, however, primarily assumed to be mental phenomena that are expressed in words and actions. This assumption has been challenged by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle, and a variety of contemporary philosophers who claim that human thought is primarily linguistic. This suggests that concepts are best understood as forms of linguistic usage. The concept-word “politics” refers to a culturally and historically variable category of social phenomena, and it is a mistake to assume that the phrase “the political” designates a theoretical concept.
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