Platform Politics: The Emergence of Alternative Social Media in India

The phenomenon of deplatforming intended as the removal of social media accounts because of breaking rules on mainstream platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram recently increased due to new terms and conditions of use of digital media, and new alternative social media platforms emerged and presented themselves as protectors of freedom expression. In this way, it becomes interesting to understand better the context of these platforms' so-called web suburbs that consist in those digital places that ≪host what we can generally call "subcultures," including fandoms, religious sects, political extremists, and subcultures≫. Since April 2020, Gab can be considered the most widespread alternative platform in Western countries, with twenty million users daily, born as Twitter and Facebook alternative social media. The alternative social media platforms are intended as other connection services between users, which is halfway between a social media and a discussion forum born to boycott the censorship actions of the main social media platforms (Meta Group, Twitter, etc.) and celebrate free speech even on controversial positions. How are sensitive topics, such as the one that concerns the skepticism related to the approvals of vaccines during the pandemic, addressed on the alternative social media platform compared to how they are dealt with on the mainstream social media platforms? This explorative work wonders about the users' points of view on vaccine concerns and the relevant differences between Gab and Facebook in addressing this topic. The empirical part of this work has been set starting from the dataset composed of Gab and Facebook content posted between March 2020 and July 2021. The posts were extracted with web scraping techniques (for Gab) and proprietary data tools (for Facebook), querying the keywords: vaccine, vaccines, anti-vax (no-vax), Covid, Covid-19, coronavirus. The collection procedure considered the different platforms' structure and their different organization of the interaction spaces. The population consisted of 8000 English writers' posts, from which 2000 posts with the highest interaction value were extracted. The dataset was analyzed using Topic Modeling, Factor, and Classification Analysis techniques. Our work's methodological output deals with comparing these social media platforms, bearing in mind their ontological objects and their algorithms' role. From the analysis emerged the differences and similarities of the social media platforms in terms of the type of content published, rates of involvement, sources of information, and directions of the considered speech. These differences have been duly highlighted by three clusters related to discourse orientation and communication approach: Conflict of views, Emotional externalization, Recommendation and practices. In addition to the type of communication and information circulating on a powerful platform such as Gab, the results help us understand the different narratives promoted on the two social media platforms and their role in the possible promotion of the same sentiment, opinions, and ideological polarization.

In the past decade, corporate social media, for all its variety, has converged on a dominant model: the sites are owned and controlled by a few people; they rely on their users to provide content; and user activity is monitored and the resulting data is sold to marketers. This model, largely an American one, is not without its critics, especially because the dominance of American corporate social media sites means that non-U.S. users are subject to U.S. government surveillance. An interesting subset of corporate social media critics are those who are actively building alternative social media systems that seek to retain the pleasures of corporate social media while excising the problems of centralized control and surveillance. This chapter theorizes alternative social media and distinguishes it from corporate social media along three main lines: technical infrastructures (software platforms, network topologies, and interface design), political economy (funding models, labor practices, and use of intellectual property regimes), and cultural practices (surveillance, activism, and social interaction). The empirical data for this study comes from the author's analysis and participation in a diverse range of alternative social media sites, including Twister, Diaspora, Ello, GNU social, and several Dark Web social media systems, as well as interviews with alternative social media creators and users.

This chapter examines Indian media. Communications scholars have long argued that media sets the agenda for public opinion, first by drawing the attention of citizens to a particular issue, and then by defining it by means of comprehensible media ‘frames’ that act as cognitive shortcuts to understand issues. As in other so-called democracies, journalists working within India’s mainstream media are engaged 24/7 in framing narratives, making them indispensable for any government. Anti-Muslim messaging, generally subtle, has been the default media frame ever since the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power in 2014. This coincided with the coming of communicative abundance, the profusion of new communication networks and technologies, and rapidly changing media consumption habits. Secretive organizations frame sophisticated misinformation campaigns to spread fake news and false claims through social media. In such a media environment marked by features common to despotisms like Vietnam, Iran, and Russia, where independent journalism is all but dead, self-censorship and toad-eating are rife.

Neo-Gnosticism and the American Dissident Right

Government Surveillance and Counter-Surveillance on Social and Mobile Media: The Case of Iran (2009)

In March 1998, following India's twelfth general election, a coalition of sixteen parties led by Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) secured a majority of seats in Lok Sabha, lower house of parliament, and formed a national government in New Delhi. For many observers, it marked a crucial turning point in modem Indian pol itics. The BJP, as front party of sangh parivar a family of militant Hindu organi zations led by Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, National Volunteer Corps), escaped its erstwhile political isolation by convincing a number of smaller secular par ties to join its ranks. In exchange, BJP shelved most contentious aspects of its agenda. Chief among them was campaign, spearheaded by its sister organization, Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP, World Hindu Council), since mid 1980s, to build a temple for Hindu god Ram in town of Ayodhya in northern state of Uttar Pradesh. The Ramjanmabhoomi campaign had led to demolition of Babri mosque, which allegedly stood on birthplace of Ram, on December 6, 1992, unleashing worst communal riots in India since partition in 1947.1 The events in Ayodhya and their aftermath convinced most secular parties to renounce electoral alliances with BJP. The BJP agreed prior to 1998 election, however, to remove Ram temple issue from its official policy platform. It also set aside other controver sial proposals such as adoption of a union civil code, which would nullify spe cial judicial arrangements regarding personal family laws governing various minority groups, and abrogation of Article 370 of constitution, which gave disputed Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir special asymmetric rights in union. As a result of these gestures, many commentators portrayed the politics of social exclusion that BJP has carried forward to new extremes [as] self-limiting in domain of representative democracy.'2 In general terms, two versions of self-limiting thesis underwrote these confident expectations. The first, more general version was that BJP as a party would respect rule of law due to general exigencies of democratic electoral politics. Committing excessive violence towards minority groups would harm its prospects at polls.3 The second, more particular version claimed that it would have to moderate its policies due to the compulsions of coalition politics.4 The inability of any single party to capture a parliamentary majority on its own after 1989 forced larger parties, such as

<p>In March 1998, following India's twelfth general election, a coalition of sixteen parties led by Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) secured a majority of seats in Lok Sabha, lower house of parliament, and formed a national government in New Delhi. For many observers, it marked a crucial turning point in modem Indian pol itics. The BJP, as front party of sangh parivar a family of militant Hindu organi zations led by Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, National Volunteer Corps), escaped its erstwhile political isolation by convincing a number of smaller secular par ties to join its ranks. In exchange, BJP shelved most contentious aspects of its agenda. Chief among them was campaign, spearheaded by its sister organization, Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP, World Hindu Council), since mid 1980s, to build a temple for Hindu god Ram in town of Ayodhya in northern state of Uttar Pradesh. The Ramjanmabhoomi campaign had led to demolition of Babri mosque, which allegedly stood on birthplace of Ram, on December 6, 1992, unleashing worst communal riots in India since partition in 1947.1 The events in Ayodhya and their aftermath convinced most secular parties to renounce electoral alliances with BJP. The BJP agreed prior to 1998 election, however, to remove Ram temple issue from its official policy platform. It also set aside other controver sial proposals such as adoption of a union civil code, which would nullify spe cial judicial arrangements regarding personal family laws governing various minority groups, and abrogation of Article 370 of constitution, which gave disputed Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir special asymmetric rights in union. As a result of these gestures, many commentators portrayed the politics of social exclusion that BJP has carried forward to new extremes [as] self-limiting in domain of representative democracy.'2 In general terms, two versions of self-limiting thesis underwrote these confident expectations. The first, more general version was that BJP as a party would respect rule of law due to general exigencies of democratic electoral politics. Committing excessive violence towards minority groups would harm its prospects at polls.3 The second, more particular version claimed that it would have to moderate its policies due to the compulsions of coalition politics.4 The inability of any single party to capture a parliamentary majority on its own after 1989 forced larger parties, such as</p> <p> </p>

<p>In March 1998, following India's twelfth general election, a coalition of sixteen parties led by Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) secured a majority of seats in Lok Sabha, lower house of parliament, and formed a national government in New Delhi. For many observers, it marked a crucial turning point in modem Indian pol itics. The BJP, as front party of sangh parivar a family of militant Hindu organi zations led by Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, National Volunteer Corps), escaped its erstwhile political isolation by convincing a number of smaller secular par ties to join its ranks. In exchange, BJP shelved most contentious aspects of its agenda. Chief among them was campaign, spearheaded by its sister organization, Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP, World Hindu Council), since mid 1980s, to build a temple for Hindu god Ram in town of Ayodhya in northern state of Uttar Pradesh. The Ramjanmabhoomi campaign had led to demolition of Babri mosque, which allegedly stood on birthplace of Ram, on December 6, 1992, unleashing worst communal riots in India since partition in 1947.1 The events in Ayodhya and their aftermath convinced most secular parties to renounce electoral alliances with BJP. The BJP agreed prior to 1998 election, however, to remove Ram temple issue from its official policy platform. It also set aside other controver sial proposals such as adoption of a union civil code, which would nullify spe cial judicial arrangements regarding personal family laws governing various minority groups, and abrogation of Article 370 of constitution, which gave disputed Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir special asymmetric rights in union. As a result of these gestures, many commentators portrayed the politics of social exclusion that BJP has carried forward to new extremes [as] self-limiting in domain of representative democracy.'2 In general terms, two versions of self-limiting thesis underwrote these confident expectations. The first, more general version was that BJP as a party would respect rule of law due to general exigencies of democratic electoral politics. Committing excessive violence towards minority groups would harm its prospects at polls.3 The second, more particular version claimed that it would have to moderate its policies due to the compulsions of coalition politics.4 The inability of any single party to capture a parliamentary majority on its own after 1989 forced larger parties, such as</p> <p> </p>

Extreme, anti-establishment actors are being characterized increasingly as ‘dangerous individuals’ by the social media platforms that once aided in making them into ‘Internet celebrities’. These individuals (and sometimes groups) are being ‘deplatformed’ by the leading social media companies such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and YouTube for such offences as ‘organised hate’. Deplatforming has prompted debate about ‘liberal big tech’ silencing free speech and taking on the role of editors, but also about the questions of whether it is effective and for whom. The research reported here follows certain of these Internet celebrities to Telegram as well as to a larger alternative social media ecology. It enquires empirically into some of the arguments made concerning whether deplatforming ‘works’ and how the deplatformed use Telegram. It discusses the effects of deplatforming for extreme Internet celebrities, alternative and mainstream social media platforms and the Internet at large. It also touches upon how social media companies’ deplatforming is affecting critical social media research, both into the substance of extreme speech as well as its audiences on mainstream as well as alternative platforms.

The relationship between television shows and social media has become increasingly intertwined in recent years. Social media platforms, particularly Twitter, have emerged as significant sources of public opinion and discourse on topics discussed in television shows. In India, news debates leverage the popularity of social media to promote hashtags and engage users in discussions and debates on a daily basis. This paper focuses on the analysis of one of India's most prominent and widely-watched TV news debate shows: 'Arnab Goswami -- The Debate'. The study examines the content of the show by analyzing the hashtags used to promote it and the social media data corresponding to these hashtags. The goal is to understand the composition of the audience engaged in social media discussions related to the show. The findings reveal that the show exhibits a strong bias towards the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), with over 60% of the debates featuring either pro-BJP or anti-opposition content. Social media support for the show primarily comes from BJP supporters. Notably, BJP leaders and influencers play a significant role in promoting the show on social media, leveraging their existing networks and resources to artificially trend specific hashtags. Furthermore, the study uncovers a reciprocal flow of information between the TV show and social media. We find evidence that the show's choice of topics is linked to social media posts made by party workers, suggesting a dynamic interplay between traditional media and online platforms. By exploring the complex interaction between television debates and social media support, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the evolving relationship between these two domains in the digital age. The findings hold implications for media researchers and practitioners, offering insights into the ways in which social media can influence traditional media and vice versa.

This paper systematically analyzes the origins and emergence of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in Indian politics, and its impact on secularism, domestic politics, and foreign policy. We contend that it was the institutional context of Indian politics in the 1980s, and not Hindu nationalist political ideology per se, that facilitated the emergence of the BJP. India's democratic institutions, particularly coalition politics, have moderated the BJP's radical policy goals. As such, the BJP does not pose a threat to the functioning of the Indian democracy. However, with its long-term goal to redefine Indian nationhood, and its dependence on the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) cadre for electoral success, the party's militant and violent agenda against minorities, especially Muslims, remains intact. The BJP's single major success has been the communalization of Indian politics by changing the discourse on secularism. In spite of its nationalist and aggressive rhetoric, there was no substantive change in India's foreign and security policies under the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (1999–2004). More broadly, this paper demonstrates that religion and democracy have always been in a dialectic in the Indian context. After all, India's nominally secular Congress party has used religious symbolism for electoral gains. As such, the equilibrium between religion and democracy needs to be constantly negotiated in India.

Chapter Seven presents a schematic account of the functions a social media platform would need to have in order to fulfil the roles required of it by anarchist cybernetics. Drawing on the negative critiques of existing social media platforms and the positive requirements outlined by activists and scholars, this chapter asks what an alternative social media platform would look like and how it would be different from the commercial platforms we use everyday. The chapter identifies four broad lines of critique aimed at the use of social media in anarchist cybernetic organising: (1) the privacy critique (2) the political economy critique; (3) the weak ties critique; and (4) the political subjectivity critique. The chapter provides a sketch of what such an alternative platform would look like, identifying the key features that aid the functionality of such a platform for self-organisation.

This study offers a concise overview of perceptions of media consumers mainly students regarding controlled social media in India. The main objective of this study was to understand how individuals perceive and respond to regulatory measures implemented in the Indian social media ecosystem. By investigating the impact of these rules on user experiences, freedom of speech and overall satisfaction with social media platforms, the study employed a method pushed by survey method. Preliminary findings indicated that Indian social media users exhibited both positive and negative reactions to the adoption of regulatory laws. While some participants appreciated the efforts to combat the spread of misinformation, hate speech and harmful content, others expressed concerns about potential limitations on free expression and increased censorship.Ensuring user confidence and equitable treatment, participants stressed the significance of transparent and consistent law enforcement. The study’s outcomes offer valuable insights into the intricate interplay between India’s social media landscape, user perceptions and regulatory initiatives. Policymakers, social media platforms and civil society organizations interested in shaping social media regulation must take into account the implications of these findings.

The study here assesses the systematic variability of service performance assessments in customer reviews placed in alternative online social media platforms in the travel industry as well as responses to the firm’s requests for customer evaluations. The research includes an empirical study conducted by a national (Spanish) hotel chain of nine corporately-owned properties (hotels). Data-analyses were performed of data collected for the nine hotels from TripAdvisor and Booking.com, as well as internal data from the hotel chain’s customer data files. The findings support the general conclusion that hotel reviews on different social media platforms vary in systematic ways. TripAdvisor reviews consistently include the largest share of detractors across all social media platforms in this study, ranging from 11 to 51%. This study contributes useful benchmarks for the relative differences in performances in customer experience assessments across different social media platforms.

Cultural norms and myths can prevent the continuation of breastfeeding. Information sharing on social media platforms is extremely fast and uncontrolled, making it the most important factor in the spread of misinformation. The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between women's social media trust, verification habits, and breastfeeding myths. This descriptive and cross-sectional study reached 258 women. Study data were collected using a sociodemographic information form, the Breastfeeding Myths Scale, and the Social Media Verification/Trust Scale. The data obtained were analyzed using independent t tests, One-Way Analysis of Variance, and the Pearson Correlation Test. An indirect effects analysis was conducted using the PROCESS Macro Model 4. The average age of participants was 33.16 ± 10.55. A significant and positive correlation was found between the Trust Score for Corporate and Individual Social Media Sharing and the total score on the breastfeeding myths scale (r = .594, p < 0.001; r = .135, p = 0.036), while a significant and negative correlation was found between social media usage time and age (r = -.346, p < 0.001). In addition, the results revealed that the effect of age on breastfeeding myths was largely mediated by the amount of time spent on social media (β = -0.086, 95% CI [-0.200, -0.011])Conclusions:Women who rely on corporate and individual social media posts are more likely to believe breastfeeding myths. Furthermore, the findings indicate that the relationship between age and breastfeeding myths is mediated by time spent on social media. It is important for health officials to promote the dissemination of evidence-based information through collaboration with professional organizations and social media platforms.