Abstract
is the average fitness of species i (and vi is defined by Eq. 2). Thus the dynamical equations state that the per capita growth rate in frequency of a strategy is proportional to the difference between the fitness of that strategy and the average fitness of the population. These dynamics assume that foragers switch continuously from the worse-than-average habitat to the better-thanaverage habitat, which is equivalent to assuming that they switch from the worse habitat to the better one, except that the weights vi and 1 vi in the average (Eq. 8b) lead to non-constant scaling factors Z1, Z2 in Eq. 7a and hence prevent (Nia, N2a) from leaving the constraint set (Ineq. 1). Of course, these are simplistic dynamics of habitat selection. More sophisticated dynamics that include aspects of learning have been explored by, for example, Bernstein et al. (1988). In conclusion: Possingham's equilibrium distribution can be regarded either as the unique ESS of a metapopulation game among nectarivores, or else as the unique and stable equilibrium point of a particular dynamical system, namely, Eq. 7 or 8. Either approach yields Possingham's solution (Eq. 6).
Published Version
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