Phänomenologische Philosophie Oder Phänomenologische Psychologie?

Abstract

AbstractThe first question raised in this article concerns the central points of Husserl's phenomenological psychology. They consist essentially of the following: (1) a re-questioning (going back) of the types of objects encountered to their mode of being experienced, and (2) an emphasis on the non-empirical (eidetic) character of this type of psychology. A criticism then follows that Husserl's analyses are too general; they are more ontologically than psychologically interesting. It is further criticized that Husserl's phenomenological psychology is primarily oriented toward the problems of gnosology and not so much at the problems of the everyday behavior of man. Nevertheless, the critique of Husserl affirms that phenomenological psychology is important for theoretical psychology insofar as Husserl very clearly develops the principles of concept-formation of psychology as a science. If phenomenological psychology is to be concrete and applicable to psychology, one must ask which are the concrete types of objects from which one has to go back to consciousness. These types of objects have been identified as work-tasks. This conception of phenomenological psychology accords with its eidetical character since the individual mode of performance of a work-task is in general largely irrelevant. To prove this conception from another viewpoint, the analysis of some French phenomenologists were scrutinized. First of all, it was shown how Politzer, one of the first French phenomenolo