Abstract
The problem on which I wish to focus attention in this paper can be briefly formulated as follows: Is it true that towards the end of his life Husserl abolished the radical distinction between phenomenological psychology and transcendental philosophy and, therefore, the distinction between the phenomenologico-psychological and the transcendental reductions, also? This question must be asked because Husserl himself seems to suggest such a view in the concluding sections of Crisis and in other manuscripts of the same period, and in addition this notion is further corroborated by Fink in his outline for the continuation of Crisis as well as by Drue in his book on Husserl’s conception of psychology.1
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