Phenomenological reduction of E. Husserl through the prism of Buddhist meditation

Abstract

The subject of this research is the method of phenomenological reduction developed by E. Husserl. The article examines the difficulties faced by this method, as well as observes the reception of Husserl’s ideas by the adherents of phenomenology in the XX century. It is substantiated that the phenomenological reduction is unrealizable by theoretical means due to impossibility to comply in the with the initial requirements of directness and non-prerequisiteness in the verbal expression. At the same time, the author proves that the phenomenological reduction could be implemented as a practice. Buddhist meditation is taken as an example. The goal is set to examine the phenomenological reduction through the prism of meditative practice. The research methodology is based on the comparative study of phenomenological and Buddhist philosophy with regards to the subject matter. The scientific novelty lies in examination of the problem of implementation of phenomenological reduction in the context of a completely different, non-Western tradition. The analysis demonstrates that Buddhism and phenomenology, proceeding from similar ideological prerequisites and studying the same subject, come to the markedly different conclusions. The examination of meditative practice indicated the differences between the phenomenology and Buddhism in their interpretation of the problem of consciousness. The fundamental difference pertains to the problem of “Self”: Buddhism does not recognize the apodictic evidence of the empirical and transcendental ego. This opinion is grounded on observation of the variable nature of the mind in the process of meditation. Other differences considered in this article consists in the discrepancy between the phenomenology and Buddhism regarding the interpretation of such concepts as “intentionality” and “ideation”.